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GEIST is an academic journal sponsored by The Sympo sium, SJSU
Philo sophy Club, in cooperation with the Department of Philosophy at SJS U. The journal is focused on publishing philosophical
papers by undergraduate and graduate students from both SJSU
and the greater academic community.
The above is the official description of GEIST. However, I hope
that GEIST lives up to its namesake and also shows the spirit behind both philo sophy and those who study it. Philosophical quandaries may not be that uncommon but pursuing and trying to make
sense out of it all academically is not as common . The aim is to
encourage this sort of philosophical investigation in both undergraduate and graduate students as well as to share their ideas with
the com munity.
I would like to thank all of the assistant editors for all their effort s
in putting together this issue of GEIST. I also want to gratefully
acknowledge all the professors on our advisory board for their reviewing, guidance, and support. We also received he lp from other
San Jose State University students and professors with various tasks .
and question s. Thank you all for helping to make this possible.
. We are still learning how best to put together a journal. As I mentioned last year, we will always work to improve GEIST and would
appreciate any feedback.
Veritas,
-S.L.G.
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ency and whether independent lines of evidence corroborate the
findings. Becau se theories are ideas, truth is the matching of our
mental constructs or representation s with the world under the guidance of a certain techne.
This position is paradigmat ic of ontic thinking . Another way
of saying ontic is to say that this epistemology works within a "regional ontology" or within a prescribed language where the Being
of these beings have been decided. In a pre-established language
game a philosopher articulates the extens ions of the regional ontology. By working within the given rules, the scientific philosophers maneuver within a pre-given set of terms to unfold the possible perm utations of that regional ontology. To work within a
regional onto logy is useful. However, this view of truth does not
explain how new regional Ontologies get established .
Heidegger offers us an explanation of how new ways of
Being and knowing get established . He offers truth as aletheia. As
aletheia, Truth is a founding act that poetically unfolds. As a founding act, it opens a clearing that presents the possibility of a new
world, a new way of thinking, a new way of being, a new way of
organizing ourselves as people . Alethei a is synonymous with revealing. This revelation occurs thro ugh language. Heidegger once
said that language is the house of Being. Our understanding limits
how we approach and regard the world . Kant showed that ideas
and relations of ideas structure this understa nding. In this century,
philosophers recognize that words represent ideas by projecting
these ideas onto the world. These ideas find themselves in speech,
in books, in architecture and organization. In more ways then one,
we live in our ideas. Since language is the house of Being , what
reveals new possibilities are "successful descriptions" of a world.
Here are some words that revealed new worlds: "We the people of
the United States of America", "We the baby boomers", "We are
the sons of earth and blood". These are paradigmatic cases which
grounds the self-knowing of a people. Another way to think of the
these successful descriptions is as a "grand narrative ." Unlike a
mere story, a grand narrative creatively unfolds in a living world.
If a regional ontology works by perpetuating an understanding,
then aletheia descri bes how new regions get establis hed.
While truth as correctness or coherency are paradigms of
science, Aletheia uses the creative arts as its wellspring for vitality.
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Can we have a scientific understanding of art? Analyt ical philosophers try to do this with an analytical aesthetics. The analytic seeks
to describe and define existing art. This app roach is doom to find
the essence of cre ativity as cre ative. Furthermore, the approach
guides thinking by pres upp osing that the re is a way we shou ld look
at artw ork. These presupposition s impose upon the artwork an
interpretative format. As Heid egger states the analytical approach :
"What art is should be inferable from the work.
What the work of art is we can come to know only
from the essence of art. Anyone can easily see that we
are mov ing in a circle . Ordinary understanding de-

mands that this circle be avoided because it violates
logic. What art is can be gathered from a comparative
examination of actual artworks. But how are we to be
certainthat we are indeed basing such an examination
on artworks if we do not know beforehand what art is?
And the essence of art can not be arrived at by a deriva-

tion from higher concepts than by a collection of characteristics of actual artworks. For such a derivation,

too, already has in view the definitions that must suffice to establish that what we in advance take to be an
artwork is one in fact. Blit selecting characteristics from

among given objects, and deriving concepts from principles, are equally impossible here, and where these
procedures are practiced they are a self-deception ('."
It interprets the artwork as an art-object and not as an art that works.
In defi ning the artwork as a thing, the interpretation hinders the
artwork by placing blinders on the human, limiting the ways that
the work can be. This critique of current aesthetic practices extends into a general attack on regional Ontologies . If one defines
"art" by "artworks" or "Being" by "beings", one externalizes a
preconception , a prejudgment, and a prej udice.
Is the distinction between truth as correctness and as aletheia
too sharp? Take the case of paradigm shifts . A paradigm can be
thou ght of an either an exem plar, a set of practices , or a body of
know ledge that defines, guides and regulates a field of research .
Paradigms shift when anomalies build as evidence against the "correctness" of a certain worldview. These anomalies are gray spots
that the guiding theories cannot explain . Eventually the build up
of unex plained phenomena causes people to rethink their po sitions,
and a shift in worldview occurs . The new worldview affords new
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ways of seeing the world . However, does the paradigm shift the
revealing of a new way of being? If it did, would that not make
"correct" truth a precond ition for aletheia? No. Although it is true
that parad igm shifts discloses new poss ibilities, there is no convergence between correctness and disclosure, even at this point. Paradigm shifts occur within disciplines with well-defined techniques.
The shift occurs when current techniques fail to do the work properly. A paradigm shift is only a shift between different schools of
techne. Aletheia results from genius and not to method.
Heidegger' s truth reveals a truth about human being as human existence. His existen tialism differs from Sartre. Sartre's
Existentialism remains trapped in the metaphysics . Heidegger
writes :
Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism this
way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he
is taking existentia and esse ntia according to their

metaphysical meaning. which from Plato's time on has
said that essentia precedes existentia . Sartre reverses

this statement. Butthereversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. With it he

states with metaphysics into oblivion of the truth of
Being. For even if philosophy wishes to determine
the relation of essentia and existentia in the sense it
had in medieval controversies , in Leibnez's sense, or
in some other way, it still remains to ask first of all

from what destiny of Being this differentiation in Being as Esse Essentiae and Esse ess istentiae comes to

appear to thinking' .
Thinking of Being in terms of existence and essence splits the world
into two realms - one marked by constant change, and one marked
by constant stability. Different phil osop hers have named one or
the other world the "real" . For Plato, the real existed as the unchanging world. His motivations were epistemological . He reasoned that knowledge is of what is. For knowledge to be know ledge it must always be true. If knowledge is always true, then
what counts, as know ledge must not change. Because knowledge
is of what is, and know ledge does not change, then what is does
not change. Since what is, is real - the real world must be immutable. While Plato calls the unchanging the form , Aristotle calls it
an essence. Sartre inverts this distinction. Instead of the essences
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being real, he calls the changing world of existence the real. In
either case, privileging existence or essence, we remain trapped in
a metaphysical framework - a two-tiered world of physics and what
is above or beyond it.
The first essays reflect this metaphysical attitude by beginning with Immanuel Kant as a thinker to think with. Matt Talbert
uses Kant's moral insights to answer the question "Why is Lying
Immoral?" Like Kant, Talbert shows that lying and the liar is
logically inconsistent. This inconsistency creates a double standard that leads to using people as a means instead of an end. To
treat someone as a means is to treat them strictly as an object, and
not a person. Use-objects do not have distinct human qualities that
grant them a certain level of rights, well being and freedom. If we
recognize our humanity, then we must recognize others as well
and not treat them strictly as objects to be used. Because lies are
made for expediency sake, lying to a person reduces people to the
status of objects. Like Kant, Talbert posits a set of immutable
standards in order to judge actual acts. These standards ground
themselves in categorical ideas, found ed on logical necessity.
Moreover, the faculty of reason acts as the lawgiver, legislating
these standards. Reason, the categories and logic, for Kant exists
outside of space and time - pure, pristine and immutable.
While Talbert works within the Kantian framework, Scott
Stroud examin es Kant and within a historical context. He writes
an explorative piece comparing Kant's moral system to the religious systems developed by the ancient Egyptians. Kantian and
Egyptian morality both spring from an ascetic attitude. An ascetic
tries to maintain order and harmony through purification. They
purify themselves by shutting out distractions, temptations and other
things that lead to an untidy life. Moreover, the ascetic maintains
order by implementing moral laws. While the Egyptians believed
that divine necessity or Maa t regulated, and justified the laws, Kant
placed Reason is that role. In either case, an infallible authority
imposed order upon a human nature that is seen as weak, transient
and conupt.
Using Kant as a departure, we arrive to Heidegger's existentialism . Instead of trying to map out the relationship between a
fixed and a fluxed world, the existentialist seeks to understand the
human condition as a being that lives in the world. Central to
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existentialism are the concepts Being and Being-with. Typically,
the word being has been taken as a verb - as in human being or as
in beings. In this sense, being is synonymous with 'thing'. Taken
as a noun, a human being gets interpreted as a "rational animal".
Metaphysical work since Aristotle has attempted to defme either
the "rational" or the "animal" component of human beings. When
we use being in this sense we operate ontically - we think of Being
in terms of beings. However, as an infmitive verb, Being is synonymous with the existence. In this sense, the phrase "human being" refers to human existence, which Heidegger calls Da-sein,
Human existence is defined by living a life. While passing through
a local Barnes and Noble, I came across a postcard. It asked, "Where
do you live? Do you live at home? Do you live at work? Do you
live in your head? Do you live in your heart? Do you live in
dreams or reality?" Here the living has nothing to do with whether
you are biologically alive or not. Instead , living has everythin g to
do with where one spends time existing. To exist means to exist in
a place with its own characteristics, condit ions and rules. It is this
place that Heidegger calls a world. It is this sense ofliving-in that
Heidegger calls a dwelling that is being-in-the-world .
Michael Jordan in an essay on homelessness examines this
lived-in experience and concludes that we are doomed to be homeless and strange. One can be homeless in two ways. One can not
be at home because one falls outside of any social circle, or one
can not be at home by not being able to live in harmony of with
Being and being oneself. We feel this sense of homelessness when
we do not at-home with our self or our situation. We can also be
homeless because we have no home at all- we have no place where
we can properl y live. The situation can be demonstrated by imagining an open space. Then imagine a walled city built atop this
plain. Within the walls human s have built a life and a home for
themselves. One is a stranger by being outside of the local life, by
not fitting into any part of the city. In the extreme, one can be
exiled out of the city into the open. There one is left to ones own
resources. Unprotected outside of city walls, the human discovers
the wider world beyond - an Earth that has no roads yet. While
some can take this uncanniness as liberating freedom, most discover that they cannot live apart from others. These people run
away from the openness and back into the confines that come with
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bein g with others. Others accept the openness. They strike out
and explore their freedom; some have the ability to esta blish a new
city with a new form of life. In choosing the city the human s find
themse lves separated from the open. In the open humans find themselves cut off from the world they know. In either case , the humans find themselves apart from the place where they must prop erly live. They find themse lves homeless.
Suppose we decide to leave the openness of being and enter
the city walls . We find within these walls not only friends, enemies and strangers - but also of men and women. We find ourselves not only as being-in-the-world, but we live in a world where
we are with others. Brian Prosser exami nes the Others in his response to Carlos Sanchez 's essay "Dangerous Enco unters : The
Other, the I, and Sociality" . Like Sanchez, Prosser examines the
live-in experience of existing as an individual in a world . While
friends and enemies surround Sanchez, Prosser's has stran gers .
Both examine human existence from the standpoint of the subject
ego, of the "I". Exis ting as themselves, for themselves, both find
themse lves in a world surrou nd by others . Sanchez 's existence is
motivated by danger. For Sanchez , these other have the pote ntial
to be friends or enemies. One typically finds this with people who
feel under siege . Prosser opens up castle gates of the self to include others that are merely strangers.
We also see others as being of a gender. Philosophers such
as Sally Haslanger, recognize that unlike Sex, gender is a construct
"defmed in terms of social relations". Moreover, "they function as
ideals for those who stand in these social relations' ." While a sex
is biologically identified, gender is not. They are norms. Wh ile
gender norms may have some biological basis, they are culturally
constructed ideals that normalize. As Mora states it, "to normalize
is to dis-empower, to dictate identity and control actions through
indirec t means ." Melanie Mo ra examines the formation of a scientific formi ng of sexuality, as well as its enforcement through
jurisprudence and discipline. She continues with an analysis of
everyday normalizing action s afte r this institutional analysis. This
science of sex is to be contrasted agains t an erotic art, which she
characterizes as a care of the self. Collectively, norms establish
fields of knowledg e/power. These regional epistemology in time
form epis temic regime. Because normative identities can be de-
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fined within a region or betw een regions, no norm has an essential
characteristic. Any defmition s of norms that rely on listing characteri stics are doomed to perpetuate a prejudgment.
Becau se we cann ot define a norm without making it appear like we 're descri bing something essential, them a Mora's normative analysis must take a new strategy. She recogn izes that norms
are defmed and redefined as peop le struggle with identity. These
struggles occur along specific battle lines. Moreover, the people
use specific tactics. A Foucaultian analysis of norm s identifies
these lines and tactics.
An example of a normative fight can be found in James
Dix's essay, as he engages in dialogue with Femini st. Here the
norm is gend er and the battle relates to how genders shou ld relate
to one another. He meditates Feminist tactics and conclu des that
these tactics fail. They fail by manipulating public opinion to create a situation where we have separated but equal worlds for men
and women . This strategy accomplishes nothing but fuel hostility,
confusion and recreate inju stices. Dix himself offers some suggestions to solve this problem .
Of the last two essays, Dirk Bruins asks whether SETI can
be used to sea rch for God. Indirectly, this question asks whether
science can be used to search for God at all. The valuable thing
about this essay is that it establishes an ontological protocol for
answering such a question. To answer this question, Bru ins describes exact ly what SETI is capable of searchi ng for. Wh ile SETI
says it search es for extraterrestrial bei ngs, what it actually picks up
are electromagnetic signals from sources within 150 light years .
Unless God is electromagnetic or uses electromagnetism, God cannot be found using SETI.
As for the last essay ... I meditate on the language of the
call . Thi s que stion is important for a Heideg garian Existentialist,
because Heidegger const antly asks us to heed the call of Being.
However, he pro vides very little analysis of what the language of
the call is. At best he says that this call comes from Being and that
it is a call to our conscience to be reso lutely ourselves. In writing
this paper, I came across a methodological problem . I needed to
demonstrate a call, yet was forced to describe this call wh en I had
to write an essay. Essays describe or argue. When I do either, I
cease to call. Si nce I cali on my reade rs to think a description of a

call may lead one to conclude that the knowing the description
itself was sufficient for thinking. To escape this problem, I decided to write several differen t texts. I urge the readers to read the
text three times, three different ways. On the first reading, read
only the "main text" without referring to the "footnote" . On the
second reading, read the "main text" and "footnotes" as you would
normally read. On the third reading, read merely the "footnotes"
in order. Each reading will should comment and shed light on
each style of reading . The differences between the readings is the
same as the difference between Metaphy sics and Ontology, or the
difference between a description of a human being tbat is a rational animal and a being -human, there; thinking.
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ApOR IA

Another Look at Kant on Lying
Matt Talbert
San Jose State University
Immanuel Kant's seemingly unequivocal condemnation of
lying is one of the best known aspects of his moral thought. At the
end of the Metaphysics ofMoraIs he claims that lying is "the greatest
violation of a human being's duty to himself," and that "By a lie a
human being throws away and, as it were, annihilates his dignity
as a human being" (MM. 6:429). ' The liar destroys his or her status as a person; for Kant "Such a speaker is a mere deceptive appearan ce of a human being " (MM. 6:429).
In this paper I shall examine Kant's general position on
lying , focu sing on what makes lying a moral wrong and how Kant
employs the logic of his categorical imperative to highl ight this
wrong . I shall also examine the seem ingly problematic position
that is found in Kant's essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie From
Philanthropy." Many readers have found Kant's total proscription
of lying here far too rigid , but I shall offer the more charitable
reading of that text which certain scholars have proposed in order
to bring Kant more in line with popular sentiment .

i
One of the basic principles that arises in the Groundwork
of the Metaphysics of Mo rals, Kant's most widely read work of
moral philosophy, is the contention that a moral evil necessarily
calls forth its own practica l contradiction. "What is morally evil,"
Kant says , "has the property, inseparable from its nature, of being
at odds with itself in its aims and destructive of them" (PP. 8:379) .
So an act which violates the moral law also violates the rational
law of non-contradiction in so far as it attempts to instantiate a
contradiction. Kant believed that he gave expression to this in the
first formulation of his categorical imperative: "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time
will that it become a universal law" (Gr. 4:421) .
Why does a violation of this imperative involve one in a
contradic tion ? To understand Kant's reaso ning we must first note
that, for Kant, if a law is to hold morally it "mu st carry w ith it
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absolute necessity," that is, it must apply universally (Gr. 4:389).
So if one wants to judge whether a personal rule, or maxim, is
morally acceptable it must be asked if the maxim can be extended
universally. If the maxim cannot be thus extended without coming
into conflict with the original intent a/the will in creating the maxim,
then the age nt act ing under that maxim is eng aged in a practical
contradiction. Such a maxim violates the categorical imperat ive
and is morally unsuitable to be operated under.
To act morally is to act under a maxim which can also be a
universal law, and when we act in violation of our moral duty, "we
find that we do not really will that our maxim should become a
universal law," rather we wish to exempt ourselves from its authority (Gr. 4:424). Yet if we exempt ourselves from a supposedly
universal maxim, we "find a contradiction in our own will, namel y
that a certain principle be objectively necessary as a universal law"
and yet not bind us and therefore not be universal (Gr. 4:424). Thu s
we attribute to our maxim the quality of universality and non-universality at the same tim e.
In the Groundwork, Kant shows how this first formulation
of the categorical imperative applies to a "lying promise." Let us
imagine, he says, a man who, because of need , borrows money
whic h he knows that he will not be able to pay back . But to receive
this (perma nent) loan the fellow must, of course, pretend that he is
willin g and able to pay it back, that is, he must lie. To apply the
categorical imperative in this case Kant says:
I ask myself: would I indeed be content that my
maxim (to get myself out of difficulties by a false
promise) should hold as a universal law (for myself as well as others)? And could I indeed say to
myself that everyone may make a false promise
when he finds himself in a difficulty he can get
out of in no other way? (Gr. 4 :403 )
But what of a world where lying is not con sidered a breach
of the moral law? In such a world no one would lend mo ney if the
loan were guaranteed only by a promise. Money is lent because of
a conviction, on the part of the lender, that the prom ise of a person
in need can be counted on as a meaningful state ment. Under most
circu mstances our state ments are preceded, as it were, by an im-
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plicit certification of their truth, that is, we expect people not to
lie-this is the only reason lying "works." Therefore, the lie Kant
proposes cannot be extended universally because-in a world where
one in financial difficulties is permitted (and, presumably, expected)
to lie-Kant's lie would fail to have its desired effect. Kant leaves
us to know that we must not lie, "no matter how great the benefits
.. . might be
Here is an unconditional necessitation through a
of reason, which I must obey; and in the face of it all
command
my inclinations must be silent" (MM . 6:48 1).
Lying, then, is immoral because it violates the rational,
and thus the moral, law. But this rather abstract application of the
first formulation of the categorical imperative may be somewhat
less than satisfying to one who wonders why it is morally wrong to
violate a law that originates in pure reason. The second formulation of the categorical imperative is perhaps usefu l for casting the
matter in starker terms.
Kant tells us that "rational nature exists as an end in itself," and that the individual "necessarily represen ts his own existence [to himself] in this way," moreover, all other rational agents
represent their existence to themselves in this way as well (Gr.
4:429). Of course, we need no incentive to regard ourselves as
ends but Kant says that since it is our rationality that certifies us as
such we must extend this courtesy to other rational agents. The
second formulation of the categorical imperative expresses this:
"So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never
merely as a means" (Gr. 4:429). To use the above example, one
who tells a lying promise to another cannot possibly view that other
as anything more than a means to the liar's own ends. The liar has
circumvented the rational process as it occurs in the other, thus
reducing him or her to the status of a mere thing, and a "thing," for
Kant, can have only contingen t value-things are not valuable in
themselves.
In The Metaphysics ofMorals Kant says that our only innate right is freedom, which he defmes as a state of "independence
from being constrained by another 's choice" (MM. 6:237). Lying
is a violation of freedom since it tampers with the rational faculty
of another person and thereby bind s their will to our own. Insofar
as we have done this we have destroyed the other's autonomy and
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freedom. A lie robs the one lied to of his or her right to give or
withhold rational consent. The person lied to is deprived of his or
her natural right to autonomy and for Kant it "is obvious that he
who transgresses the rights of human beings intends to make use
of the person of others merely as a mean s" (Gr. 4:430) . When seen
in this light it is perhap s easier to understand why Kant counted
lying as so profoundly inimical to the moral life; a lie strikes at the
most basic part of our humanity - the freedom which is ours through
our rationality.'

11
A problem seem s to arise in Kant's doctri ne on lying when
we turn to the readin g that is generally given to his brief essay "On
a Supposed Righ t to Lie From Philanthropy." Kant wrote this essay as a reply to a 1797 article by the French liberal philoso pher
Benjamin Constant entitled "On Political Reaction s." In his article Constant writes that "a German philo sopher [Kant] ," maintains "that it would be a crime to lie to a murderer who asked us
whether a friend of ours whom he is pursuing has taken refuge in
our house" (Quoted in Ph . 8:425 ). And, indeed, Kant says that to
"be truthful (hone st) in all declarations is . .. a sacred command of
reason prescribing unconditi onall y, one not to be restricted by any
conveniences," every individual has, therefore, "the strictest duty
to truthfulne ss in statements he cannot avoid, though they may harm
himself or others" (Ph. 8:427 & Ph. 8:428) .3
All thi s is rather curiou s when we take into account Kant's
deepl y held belief that his philosop hizing in the realm of ethics did
no more tha n render systematic that which we all know in a natural, if incipient, fashion. Yet Kant 's complete prohibition of lying
offends many, if not most, people's moral intuitions. Perhaps Kant's
reasons for takin g such a hard line can be made apparent if we look
more closely at what Constant was suggesting in his own article.
Constant says that: "To tell the truth is a duty, but only to one who
has a right to the truth" (Quoted in Ph. 8:425). So Constant is
saying that our variou s duties are inextricabl y connected to the
specific right s of other people ; thus, "where there are no rights,
there are no duties" (Quoted in Ph. 8:425). Constant says that we
have no duty to tell the truth to an indi vidual who has no right to it,
and the would-be murderer in the above exampl e has forfe ited his
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right to the truth since he intends to use it for bad ends.
In response to Constant, Kant states his principle that:
''Truthfulness in statements that one cannot avoid is a human being's
duty to everyone" (Ph. 8:426) . Yet, Kant says, it is not that I wrong
him who ''unjustly compels me to make . .. [a] statement if I falsify it," rather, I have failed in my more genera l duty to humanity
(Ph. 8:426). And this in that "I bring it about , as far as I can, that
statements (declara tions) in general are not believed . . . and this is
a wrong inflicted upon humanity generally" (Ph. 8:426). In acting
under a princip le which promotes lying, I work toward the destruction of rationality, communication, and human society as such. To
stave off such a peril, Kant says that he will not take Constant's
princi ple as his own, "because the duty of truthfu lness . . . makes
no distinction between perso ns" (Ph. 8:429).
What Kant is wary of is the construction of a moral maxim
that allows lying. How could such a maxim not generat e a practical contradiction-it would render our communicatio n, non-communicative? He is also at pains to avoid the construction of a maxim
that would bind a duty to a prior right. Duty exists unconditionally
insofar as human beings are not perfectly rational and must actively compel themse lves to do their duty in the face of their opposing inclinations, and Kant will not sanction a maxim that renders duty subordinate to subjec tive considerations.
Kant' s main preoccupation in "On a Supposed Right to
Lie," and in the realm of practical philosophy in general, is the
maintenance of an apparatus for the construction of the genera l
maxims under which we ought to perform our duties. It is not,
therefore, Kant's prime motive to tell us how to act in individual
situations. The heading of section VI of the second part of the
Metap hysics ofMora ls tells us that "Ethics does not give laws for
Actions . . .but only for Maxims of actions" (MM . 6:388) . Given
this, we can understand why Constant's suggestion that we should
construct a maxim that seems to require lying would be so offensive to Kant and why this sugges tion would demand such a vigorous rejection.'
Anot her way of approaching this prob lem, if we wish to
reconcile Kant with popular sentiment on this issue, is to examine
why his contention in "On a Supposed Right to Lie" strikes so
many people as unju st.' Why is it that Kant's conclusion here is so

16

GEIST

widely offensive, especially if we are inclined to be charitable with
regard to Kant's belief that his moral theory closely mirrors the
process of ordinary ethical decisi on making?
If Kant were completely intransigent on the question of
lying we might suppose that he has simply ignored the possibility
of a conflict of duties, namely, that our duty not to lie might come
into conflict with a clear duty to, for instance, protect the innocent.
Now Kant says little about protecting the innocent from unju st
persecution but he does say that we are bound to act beneficent ly
toward others , "the happiness of others is . ..an end that is also a
duty" (MM. 6:393). But this is a "w ide" duty, that is, we have
some latitude in our manner of carrying it out.
Of course, we might want to require an act of beneficence
in conditions where the need is great, and where an individual is
able to offer such aid as can meet this need . If we can save a life by
a small word or deed then we have a duty to perform this deed. In
such a case, an act of benefi cence ought not be considered discretionary.
Now if a "w ide" obligation (one that can be fulfilled in
many different ways according to the judgment of the acto r), conflicts with a "narrow" duty (one that impinges on our actions categorically, usually as a prohibition) the tension is easily resolved.
We must simply act according to our narrow obligation-that is,
we must do what we are unconditionally obligated to do-there
will be another time when we can act on our wide duty. But what
to do when two narrow obli gation s seem to be mutuall y contradictory but both, since they are narrow, impinge on us categorically?
What do we do if we feel that we have a categorical duty, say, to
save a life, but this, for some reason, comes into conflict with our
categorical duty not to tell a lie?
First, it is necessary to note that, for Kant , there can, strictly
speaking, be no conflict in our duty.' In a very real sense we have
only the duty to live in accordance with the rational, moral law. As
Kant says, duty is that "necessity, which reason lays directly upon
a human being, of acting in conformity with its law" (MM. 6:481482). Any conflict, therefore, between rational ly generated maxims is only apparent. If it is our duty to act under one maxim, then
to act under a contradictory maxim, far from being necessitated, is
actually prohibited. Thus, "two rules opposed to each other canno t
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be necessary at the same time, if it is a duty to act in accordance
with one rule, to act in accordance with tbe opposite rule is not a
duty but even contrary to duty" (MM. 6:224).
Each obligation is in some way "grounded" in our duty,
but when obligations come into conflict we will find that, with
regard to these grounds, "one or the other .. . is not sufficient to put
. . .[us] under obligation . . . so that one of them is not a duly"
(MM. 6:224). The "stronger ground ofobligation prevails" (MM.
6:224). Thus, it is at least conceivable that a person might tell a lie,
but that the action would still conform to their duty. In this case
we would not say that such a person bas ignored his or her obligation to refrain from lying because , in fact, he or she was not, at that
time, obligated not to lie.
While we do not have separate duties which come into
conflict with each other it is clear that there will be times when
rules seem to pull us in different directions. It is, presuma bly, our
faculty of judgment which we must use to make decisions concerning the strength of the grounds of our various obligations. As
Kant says, j udgment, "sharpened by experience," is used when
dealing with moral laws "to distinguish in what cases they are applicable" (Gr. 4:389) .
But what of Kant's alleged rigor, for which he has received
so much disapproval ? I think that, given the above reading , Kant's
doctrine is not so repellent, even as it appears in "On a Supposed
Right to Lie From Philanthropy." Kant is not so rigorous as to
have us follow our "duty" even though immorality should arise
from doing so. But Kant is, of course, rigorous. He would hold us
to our duty, because it is our duty, in many circumstances when we
might wish to take an easier path-by telling a lie, or through some
other expedient.

Notes
'For all quotations from Kan t I have relied on Mary
Gregor' s translations as found in Mary J. Gregor (ed. & trans .),
The Cambridge Edition ofthe Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The
pagination given internally here, and in Gregor 's edition, is the
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standard one found in the Royal Prussian (German) Academy of
Science's Kant 's Gesammelte Schriften. I have abbreviated the
titles of Kant's works as follows : Metaphysics of Morals (MM .),
Groundwork ofthe Metaphysics ofMorals (Gr.), Critique ofPractical Reason (Pr.), Toward Perpetual Peace (PP.), and "On a Supposed Right to Lie From Philant hropy" (Ph.).
' Given Kant's vehemence on the subjec t of vera city, it is
perhaps curious to find him deliberatin g on how much of our secret selves it is nec essary to divulge in the context of social relation ship s (MM. 6:472-473) . Kant even suggests that when we
would rather not tell the truth we may reso rt, not to lyin g to be
sure, but to "si mp le silence, ment al reservations, noncommittal
answers, evasions, and equivocations" (Roge r Sullivan, Immanuel
Kant's Moral Theory [Cambridge, Cambridge University Press:
1989), p. 172). Of course we are not obliged to reveal the full
contents of our mind to everyone we meet, but if part of the problem with tellin g a lie is that it is a form of non-communication in
the guise of communicat ion, then an equivoca tion co uld easily be
just as wrong as a lie. Eve n "s imple silence," at the wro ng time,
could be a violation of our duty. Certainly we are sometimes required to volunteer information that no one has asked for. As we
shall see, the solution to thi s prob lem lies in the fact that, for Kant,
a significant burden is placed on the faculty of j udgment in the
application of the moral law.
' Christine Korsgaard in "Th e Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," (Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 [Fall 1986]: pp.
325-49) cites examples in Kant's published lectures where he suggests another direction than the one take n in "On a Supposed Right
to Lie." For example, Kant says that "if! cannot save myself [from
unju st violence) by maintai ning silence, then my lie is a weapon of
defense," (quot ed in Korsgaard, p. 338, from Kant's Lectures on
Ethics.)
4A similar argume nt can be found in Sullivan , Moral
Theory, pp. 173-77 (see note 4) and , in a less developed form, in
Robert J. Benton, "Political Exped iency and Lying , Kant vs. Benjamin Constant," The Journal of The History of Ideas 43 (1982) :
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pp. 135-44. Benton says that, to Kant, Constant's essay would
have appeared as "an exercise in political opportunism .. .. Thu s,
a major theme of " . [Kant 's] essay is an attack on mere expediency in political theory and an attempt to show how truly principled action is both necessary and possible" (p.l39).
' Certainly not everyone is eager to do this. See Wolfgang
Schwarz, "Kant's Refutation of Charitable Lies," Ethics 81 (19701
71): p. 66. Schwarz not only defends a "literalist" reading of Kant,
but also defends Kant's suppose d position as the only moral one.
' The reading 1will give here is substantially similar to that
in Sullivan, Moral Theory, pp. 173-77 (see note 4). Jules Vuillemin
too seems to move around a similar point in "O n Lying: Kant and
Benjamin Constant," Kantstudien 73 (1982): pp. 413-424. See
especially p. 422.
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Moral Theory and Practice:
Cross-Cultural Analogues in Kantian and
Ancient Egyptian Moral Philosophy
Scott Stroud
University ofthe Pacific
"He wants to tidy up the room, and I' m in the way.
I am uncleanliness and disorder."
-Ivan I1ych, from Leo Tolstoy's The Death of/van Ilych
Introduction
One of the important ideas that Immanuel Kant introduces
in his conception of duty is the abstract nature of the moral law;
from this "pure" notion rational individuals are able to derive specific behaviors and maxims for action (Beck, 1963). While contemporary philosophers are quite cognizant of Kant' s significance
(Stumpf, 1993), virtually no research has been conducted on a moral
system that shares uncanny similarities to Kant's work- that of
the ancient Egyptians. This paper seeks to extend comparative
philosophical research into the unexami ned area of cross-cultural
analogues between ancient Egyptian moral philosophy and Kantian
moral philosophy. The Egyptian concept of maat and its application will be demon strated to have important links with Kantian
moral law and its application. Initially, the similarity maat shares
with Kant's conception of moral law shall be examined. Then a
textual analysis of the "Declaration of Innocence" from the Egyptian Book of the Dead will be undertaken to establish a correlation
between Kantian and Egyptian appli ed moral law. This paper does
not make the claim that Kant' s work is unoriginal; on the contrary,
it attempts to strengthen his ideas by placing them in a larger crosscultural context ranging over 5000 years.
Analogous Concept s of Natural and Moral Law
The analogous relation between Kant's conception of moral
law and the Egyptian idea of maat will now be elucidated. First,
Kant 's conception of moral law as indicated in the Foundations of
the Me taphysics of Morals (referred to as Foundations) and the
Critique of Practical Reason (referred to as CPrR) shall be discussed, and then its relation to maat shall be explored. In the Foundations, Kant argued that "everything in nature works according
to laws" and that humans are not exemp t from this rule (1985, p.
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29/[413]). In the same paragraph he stated "Only a rational being
has the capacity of acting accord ing to the conceptio n of laws, i.e.,
. according to principles . This capacity is will" (p. 29/[413]). Thus,
in Kant we have a law-governed universe, with humans acting on
principle s (potential laws) just like everything else. Since laws are
absolute, humans must choose a determining principle that can truly
stand as a universal law, i.e. one that could logically determine the
wills of all other rational beings without contradiction. Thus, Kant
indicated in the second formulation of the categorical imperative
in Foundations "the imperative of duty can be expre ssed as follows: Act as though the maxim of your action were by your will to
become a universal law ofnature" (1985, p. 39/[422]) . This same
idea is evident in the following version of the categorical imperative in CP rR : "So act that the maxim of your will could always
hold at the same time as the principle giving universal law" (Kant ,
1993, p.30/[3 1]). The fundame ntal insight is that humans should
act on princi ples that could be (and therefore logically are) "universal law."
Of course, Kant is not claim ing that the laws of the physical world are to be equated with the law that determines one's will
in the strictly causal and desc riptive sense. On the contrary, Caygi ll
(1995) indicates that "Theoretical knowledge [for Kant] is concerned with ' what is' acco rding to the causality of natural laws,
while practical knowledge is concerned with what ought to be according to the causality of the laws of freedom" (p. 275). Instead,
moral law holds a determinant necessity in the practical sense over
what humans should will if they are to uphold their nature as rational beings. Not every human wills and acts in a moral fashion,
thus it is safe to assume that this moral law does not act with the
same physical and causal necessity as the law of gravity, for instance. Instead of necessarily influencing objects, Kant draws attention to the universal nature of both the moral law and laws of
nature (governing the physical world). He illustrates this point in
an analogical fashio n in Foundations when he writes, immediately
before the "natural law" formulation of the categorical imperative,
"The universality of law according to which effects are produced
constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense
(as to form), i.e., the existence of things so for as determined by
universal law" (p. 39/[422], emphasis added) . Thus, the moral
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law is compared to a natural law in so far as it brings the elements
of universality, non-contradict ion, and order to a rational being's
will.
It is our ability to allocate value and to act on the categorical imperative that led Kant to postulate the idea of the "kingdom
of ends." It is in this realm that we all are both legislators and
legislation-followers. Kant indicated in the Founda tions the entwined nature of morality and the kingdom of ends:
Morality, therefore, consists in the relation of every actio n to that legislation through which alone
a realm of ends is possible. This legislation, however, must be found in every rational being. It
must be able to arise from his [or her] will, whose
principle then is to take no action according to any
maxim which would be inconsistent with its being a universal law and thus to act only so that the
will throug h its maxims could regard itself at the
same time as universally lawgiving (p. 52/ [434]) .
That which motivates us to action needs to be a maxim that could
hold for all; it must be instantiated as a universal law of nature
similar to gravity (in regard to its necessary effects, albeit on the
will instead of physical objects). Kant discerned in the idea of a
kingdom of ends and the categorical imperative an illustration of
how a maxim could become universal law, enabling an ordered,
harm onious kingdom of ends to function as it should.
It is this last idea that provides a basis from which to compare the idea of Kant' s idea of the moral law and the moral law of
moat. Both Kant and the ancient Egyptians realized that moral
law was a subset of universal law that mandated willful harmony
with one's world and being (i.e. as a willing and acting being).
Ashby (1998) indicates that moat "implies harmony with the universe" (p. 18). The ancient Egy ptians believed that to achieve this
harmony was to apply (will) the principle of moat in the myriad of
moral situations they were faced with. In order to uphold the universal nature of moral law, one must attempt to will it in a consistent fashion (i.e., produce actions and principles that are in accord
or harmony with it). According to Baines (1991), the principle of
moat was seen as the element of order and truth in the world, as
opposed to the concept of izfet, which translates as disorder or chaos.
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The Egyptians saw it as morally virtuous to let oneself be determined by maar, and as the sage Ptah-hotep stated, "long-lived is
the man whose rule ofconduct is in accordance with maat" (Morenz,
1996, p. 115). Morenz (1996) states "the worshipper proclaims
God's works [maat] in the manner which seems right to him [the
individual], as a member of Egyptian society" (p. 4). Here we observe a strikingly similar theme to a key element in Kantian morality; the separation between abstract "rules" of the will and the actions that flow from them. Maat became a general norm to guide
the actions of the ancient Egyptians; in a com parative spirit, one
could label it as a "universal law" or "max im" due to its abstract
characte r. As opposed to simple divine commandments, this underly ing basis of Egyptian morality was conceptual and formal
in nature, thus leading one to notice obvious similarities to the formal categorical imperative.
One may object that basing actions on maat is similar to
acting a certain way because God commanded it (Korsgaard, 1998).
Regardless of the place of God in the Egyptians' and Kant's system, the important element is essentially the same- the focus on
natural law. Kant recognized the similarity between moral law
and natural law in his epistemological explanation in the Foundations that "A realm of ends is thus possible only by analogy with a
realm of nature" (p. 57/[439]). Clark (1998) argues that "mayet
[maat]- is probably the earliest approach to the concept of 'Nature' as understood in Western thought. It marks a break with the
old mythical cosmology where the processes of nature were understood in terms oflegend and ritual symbol" (p. 143). While not
as sophisticated or analytical as the Kantian idea of moral law or
the kingdom of ends, the basic emphasis on harmony and absolute
law is the same. Morenz (1996) indicates that "maat is right order
in nature and society...This state of righteous ness needs to be preserved or established in great matters as in small. Maat is therefore not only right order but also the object ofhuman activity . Maat
is both the task which man sets himself and also, as righteousness,
the promise and reward which await him on fulfilling it" (p. 113,
emphasis added). Here we have the ideas of the foundation of
human moral action and self-legislation being associated with maat.
The individ ual then applies this abstract concept in a deontological
fashion to conform his or her action s to the universal order or law.
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Textual Correlation of Applied Moral Law
An important aspect to both the Kantian and Egyptian moral
systems was the application of the abstract moral law to everyday
life. Whi le maat and Kant's moral law have been shown to be very
similar in abs trac t form, the issue of analogues in applied ethics
must be examined. Thi s paper now addresses the follow ing researc h question:
Will Egyptian moral rules (applications of moat)
be classifiable on Kant 's division of possible duties (from the Metaphysics ofMo rals)?
This divis ion cove rs duties to onesel f, to others, to subhu man beings (ani mals, etc.), and superhuman beings (God, god s, etc .)(Kant,
(996). While Kant denied two parts of this division (duties to
subhuman beings and superhuman beings), the complete classification will be used to highlight similarities and differenc es with
Egyptian moral philosophy. This division, from the Metaphysic of
Morals (referred to as MM) , concerns the "beings in relation to
whom ethical obligation can be tho ught"(Kant, 1996, p . 169/
[6:4 12)).
Ancient Egyptian moral instructions and maxims abo und
in their literature. While the "Instruction" genre and other sources
of literature contain moral maxims (Clark, 1998; Erman , 1995;
Simp son, 1973), this initial survey will instead focus on what has
bee n claimed to be the seminal moral text: the Book of the Dead
(Morenz, 1996). Silve rman (1991 ) ind icates that this book of
fune rary texts was wide ly available to both the royalty and the
public. The importan t part of this text for testing the above hypothesis is Chapter 125, which is also know as the "Declaratio n of
Innocence" (Faulkne r, 1997). In this chapter, the deceased indi. vidual is confro nting the gods of the afterlife and proclaims his or
her innocence. Thi s chapter is particularly good for co mparative
analysis because the moral application of moat is do ne in a "perfect" manner, which is the ideal state of actio n and virtue in which
the deceased would prefer the gods see him or her as occupying.
Fro m these ideal actions/i naction, we can derive the moral maxims that Kant figures into his classifica tion of duty. Th is class ification of duty was graphically co rrelated with the statements from
the seco nd stanza of the "Declaration of Innocenc e" for the purposes of this paper. The results of this textual analysis can be fou nd
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in chart form in the Appendix. The translation of Chapter 125 to
be used is by Lichtheim (1976). While the confines of this paper
prevent an adequate analysis of all parts of the declarat ion and the
Kantian text that correlates with them, a few preliminary remarks
can be made
In regard to "duties to oneself," three significant correlations are apparent. The first coincides with the declarations from
the deceased of "I am pure, I am pure, I am pure !" This is very
similar to the ideals expre ssed in the Foundations and in the CPrR.
In these two works, Kant indicated that while humans cannot be
holy wills (morally perfect agents), they should attempt to always
will maxims in line with the universal law that these holy wills
would follow (Kant, 1985; Kant, 1993). In the MM, Kant argued
that humans have a duty to increase their moral perfection, indicating:
This perfection co nsists subjectively in the purity
or one's disposition to duty.. .Here the command
is 'be holy' ... Herethecommand is 'be perfect' ... a
human being's striving after this end always remains only a progress from one perfection to another (1996, p. 196/[6:446]).
Also, the declaration of " I have not copulated or defiled myself '
suggests the maxim of sexual control and natural function. These
themes are offered by Kant in the MM; he followed the "natural
use" argument by indicating "sex ual love is destined by it [nature]
to preserve the species; in other words, .. .[this] is a natural end"
(1996, p. 178/[6:424]). Kant also pointed out that humans have a
duty, similar to the stated declaration, to prevent the "making [of]
himself [or herself into] a plaything of the mere inclinations and
hence a thing" (1996, p. 175/[6 :420]). Both Kant and the Egyptians seem to recognize both the animal nature of humans and their
purely moral nature; thus, duties arise both to our animal-self and
the self that is capable of conceiving of the moral order of the world
(the purely moral being).
The last four statements of "I have not increased or reduced
the measure," "I have not cheated in the fields," "I have not added
to the weight of the balance," and "I have not falsified the plummet of the scales" espouse the maxim of not lying or cheating.
Kant indicated in the MM that:
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The greatest violation of a human being' s duty to
himself [or herself] regarded merely as a moral
being is the contrary of truthfulness, lying ... By a
lie a human being throws away and, as it were,
annihilates his [or her] dignity as a human being
(1996, p. 182/[6:429]).
An interesting aspect to notice is that these Egyptian declarations
contain no mention of the consequences of untruthfulness; this is
very similar to Kant' s observation that "in ethics [duties of virtue],
... no authorization is derived from harmlessness [in regard to intentional untruths]" (1996, p. 182/[6:429]). A definite correlation
exists between the duties to oneself imposed by the categorical
imperative and the idea of maar.
"Dutie s to other beings" includes more declarations than
any other section; this is to be expected since mora l law primarily
governs human interactions. The first two statements and the last
eight all indicate the presence of a maxim of benevolence. Through
the negation of maliciou s behaviors, the deceased is proclaiming
to the gods that he or she has recognized others as worthy of respect and love through not causing them harm and hardship. Again,
consequences for the deceased person are not ment ioned ; presumably, even malicious behaviors that would have benefited him or
her would still be condemned and abhorred . Gregor (1964) points
out the Kantian analogue in that "these duties to others include not
only our pursuit of their happiness but also duties of respect [i.e.
their autonomy]" (p. xxxiv). By not maligning servants ( and presumably others), the Egyptian maintains the moral order and avoids
the Kantian vice of "immediate inclination...to bring into the open
something prej udicial to respect for others"( 1996, p. 212/[6:466]).
Throug h disavowing the maxim that allows one to intentionally
harm others, the Kantian vice of maliciousness is avoided. Kant
indicates in the MM that "Malice, the direct opposite of sympathy,
is likewise no stranger to human nature; hut when it goes so far as
to help bring about ills or evil it makes hatred of huma n beings
visible and appears in all its hideousness" (1996, p. 207/[6:459]).
The correlation that appears between the Kantian ideal s of duties
to others and the instantiations of maar is the idea of moral equivalence of human beings . At a base level, even the servants of Egyptian society had a moral right to protection from malicious actions .
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The order of the world, maar, is such that humans must treat each
other as respected and loved mora l agents. As Gregor (1964) indicates, "in fulfilling our duties of virtue to others we are striving to
realize an "intelligible" or moral world, in which love and respect
are analogous to the forces of repulsion and attraction in the physical world" (p. xxxv). By upholding this kingdom of ends, Kant
recognized a similar idea to maar; the truly moral world that we all
putatively aim for is rule governed and is a part of nature.
An important aspect readily evident in these two section s
is the bifurcation between the previously mentioned "abstract" idea
of maar and the challenge posed to each Egypt ian to instantiate it
through his or her actions. Hornung (1982) argues that "this state
[of order] is always being disturbed, and unremitting effort is necessary in order to recreate it in its original purity. Like the injured
and perpetually healed 'eye of Horus,' maar therefore symbolizes
this pristine state of the world" (p. 213). Both the Kantian and
Egyptian response enshrine order and virtuous perfection in their
application of moral law.
The last two categories, "duties to subhuman beings" and
"duties to superhuman beings," are excluded from a pure science
of ethics by Kant (1996). While space limitations prevent exploration of and possible argumen tation agai nst this exclusion, a few
comments can be made concerning these Egyptian declarations and
their relation to the Kantian system . The seven declarations concerning the treatment of subhuman beings could be indicative of
the application of maar to all members of the physical world. The
Egyptian s seemed to recogni ze a place for plants, environmental
features, and animals in the order of the world. An interesting
conjecture could be made about the extension of moral law to these
members of the world by analogy with the applicability of physical laws; unfortunately, this issue must rest unexplored in this pa-

per.
The category of "duties to superhuman beings" threatens to leave the province of practical reason and migrate into
speculative metaphysics. While it is hard to reconcile these
declarations with the view of religion presented by Kant in th e
MM, one can aga in notice the emp hasis on order tha t the application of the moral law of maat had for Egyptian moral philosophy. Just as there was an order "below" humanity, tb ere
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was an or der abo ve--the souls ofthe departed, gods, u nk nown
energies, etc.- that must be maintained (Mo renz, 1996). An ot her exceptional feature of these declarations is the utterance
of "I have not done what the god ab hors," This is crucial because it prevents the previous categories of decla rations, and
with it much of Egyptian moral philosophy, from being heteronomous elements that a re commanded by a god . This supports the analysis earlier in the paper that one upholds m oat
not out of fear of God/gods, hut instead out of knowing one's
position in the moral fabric of the world.
Conclusion
The Egyptians inhabited a hostile desert environment, much
differen t from the life that Kant knew, that radically affected their
moral philosophy and religious thought (Shafer, 1991; Silverman,
1991). Their concept and myth of maat was descriptive of the moral
law that humans were obligated to follow (Lesko, 1991; MacKenzie,
1994). It is this idea of order and moral law that this paper has
clai med to be similar to Kant's conception of the moral law. The
analogues between Egyptian and Kantian moral philosophy have
been demonstrated by first examining the abstract conception of
moral law. While Kant had more analytically sophisticated and
articulated concepts to use and oppose (i.e., the developed problem of subjectivity) , both he and the ancient Egyptians were attempting to discuss the same aspect of existence- what constituted a moral determination of a human's will? Both conceptual
schemes arrive at a solution that stresses order and universality in
the will that has ready analogues in the universality and order imposed by natural laws on the physical world. The similarities in
practical application of this law have been explicated by an exploratory textual ana lysis of the "Declaration of Innocence" as compared to Kant's categorization of duty in the Metap hysics ofMorals. Budge (1995), a noted Egyptologist, stated "the Egypti ans
possessed, some six thousand years ago, a religion and a system of
morality which .. .stand second to none among those which have
been develo ped by the greatest nations of the world" (p. viii). It is
quite a feat of the human mind that such ancient ideas can be so
correlated with modern thought.
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Appendix: Duty Comparison'

To Oneself

fiJ have not know what should not be
known [falsity]
fiJ have not copulated or defiled myse lf
fiJ am pure , J am pure, J am pure , J am pure!
fiJ have not increased or reduced the measure
fiJ have not cheated in the fields
oj have not added to the weight of the balance
fil have not falsified the plummet of the scales
To Subhuman Beings

fil have not mistreated catt le
fiJ have not deprived cattle of their pasture
fiJ have not snared birds in the reeds of the gods
fiJ have not caugh t fish in their ponds
fiJ have not held back water in its season
fiJ have not damned a flowing stream
fiJ have not quenched a needed fire
To Other Beings

fiJ have not done crimes against people.
fiJ have not done any harm
fiJ did not begin a day by exacting more than
my due
fiMy name did not reach the bark [boat] of
the mighty ruler
fiJ have not robbed the poor
nl have not maligned a servant to his master
fiJ have not caused pain
fiJ have not caused tears
fiJ have not killed
fiJ have not ordered to kill
fiJ have not made anyone suffer
fiJ have not taken milk from the mouth of children
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To Superhuman Beings
nI have not sinned in the place of truth [a templ e]
nI have not bla sphemed a god
nl have not done what the god abhors
nI have not damaged the offerings in the temp les
nI have not depleted the loaves of the gods
nI have not stolen the cakes of the dead
nI have not diminished the arura
nI have not neglected the meat offerings
nI have not detained cattle belongi ng to the god
nI have not stopped a god in his procession
'Chart structure taken from The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant, 1996);
Declarations taken from Chapter 125 of Book ofthe Dead (Liehtheim,
p. 124-126, 1976).
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'Condemned to be Homeless?':
Is Heidegger a Pessimist?
Michael Jordan
San Jose State University
Although Heidegger's primary focus from his early to his
later works was to decipher the meaning of Being, Heidegger's
analysis of the human condition reveals a pessimistic aspect of his
philosophy that is often overlooked. Heidegger's analysis of human existence is based on an underlying assumption that man is
inherently incapable of sustaining an authentic existence within
the truth of Being. Though the requirements to achieve authenticity can be momentarily fulfilled, the feeling Heidegger described
as "Unh eimlichkeit" (Homelessness) significantly inhibits man
from being able to sustain an authentic existence. According to
Heideg ge r, the re is no esc aping th e fe eli ng or mood of
homelessness. This becomes evident when we take into consideration the different contexts in which Heidegger used this term. In
Being and Time, homelessness is experienced when Dasein opens
itself up to the truth of Being. However, in Heidegger's later works
such as, Building Dwelling Thinkin g and Man Poetically Dwells,
the feeling of homelessness is experienced when man closes himself off from the truth of Being.' Heidegger's circular description
of the feeling of "Homelessness" leads to the conclusion that man
is inherently condemned to live an inauthentic existence.
In this essay, I will support the above claims by giving a
detailed analysis of the different ways in which Heidegger used
the term "Unheimlichkeit". In the first half of the essay I will
focus on the first meaning of the word and in the second half of
this essay I will discuss the latter. It is my hope that this analysis
will bring to light the fact that Heidegger is asserting that a sustainable authentic existence is beyond our grasp. From Heidegger's
pessimistic view, man is condemned to be forever homeless.
My search for the meaning of the Heid eggeri an term
"Homelessness" proved to be a difficult and challenging task. I
have found not one, but two different ways in which Heidegger
claimed we experience the feeling of homelessness. The first meaning of the term homelessness, as noted above, is foun d in
Heidegger's early work titled, Being and Time. Here, it appears
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that the feeling of homelessness is a result of Dasein 's authentic
existence. Anxiety, which throws Dasein towards an authentic
existence , causes Dasein to face death. Heidegger stated 'In anxiety one feels uncanny
here uncann iness also means "not-being-at-home".' Being-toward-death (living authentically) is the
cause of Dasein 's feeling of uncanniness or homelessness. Therefore, if Dasein opens itself to 'Being ' by becoming authentic, then
Dasein is condemned to be "Homeless".
The first meaning of the term 'Homelessness' is directly
referred too in specific passages within the text. In Being and Time,
Heidegger Stated;
.... the everydaypublicness of the 'they' , which bring
tranquilized self-assurance... Being-at-home, with all
of its obviousness ... into the everydayness of Dasein.
On the other hand, as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it
back from its absorption in the 'world' . Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized as
Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existen-

tial 'mode' of the ' not-at-home"
According to Heidegger, Dasein feels 'at home' in the realm of the
'they' or common man . This world allow s Dasein to escape its
fundamental characteristic Heidegger termed, Being-towards-death.
The realm of the common man offers Dasein an opportunity to
escape the uneasy feeling associated with death and lead, in essence, a deathless life. In the 'they' , death does not implicitly belong. Death is present, but it is viewed in terms of the 'one' and
not the ' many'. In this world, Dasein develops a sense of security
and 'homeness' . However, because Dasein is denying its essential
characteri stic of Bei ng-towards death, Heidegger claims Dasein is
living an inauthentic life.
Although Dasein has a feeling of "homeness" , it is denying its own self in its inauthent icity. This causes Dasein to have a
feeling of what Heidegger calls, "Anxiety" . In this mode , the familiarity and tranquillity of the realm of the ' they' begins to become meaningless. The feeling of anxiety, according to Heidegger,
throws Dasein into itself. Although Dasein feels anxiety of its own
'self' (existing authentically), the anxiety, at the same time, reveals Dasein's 'self' . The revealing is the understanding and acceptance of Dasein's essent ial characteristic; death. The anxiety
of death causes Dasein to have a feeling of what Heidegger calls ,
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"Unheimlichkeit". This term refers to a feeling of uncanniness,
unea siness, as well as, "Homelessness". Therefore, anxiety forces
Dasein to face dea th and become authenti c. By opening itself to
Being, Dasein is thrown out of its home. The authentic existence
is an existence of homelessness.
However, being outside the secure home of common man
causes Dasein to flee from its ' self '. Everyday Dasein flees death,
because to die, is to feel uneasy. Heidegger calls this 'fleeing'
"Falling".
Lost in the 'they' , can dwell in tranquilized familiarity.
When in falling we flee into the "at home" of publicness, we flee in the face of the "not-at-home"; that is,
we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in
Dasein. 4

In falling, Dasein turns away from its authentic existence in order
to relieve the feeling of homelessness. However, anxiety throws
Dasein back toward it. This feeling exists within Dasein itself and
is something it can never really escape from . "Anxiety, as a basic
state of mind, belongs to Dasein's essential state of Being-in-theworld .... the mode of a state of mind".' Anxiety forces Dasein to
be both at home and homeless at the same time . According to
Heidegger, there is no remed y for this existential state. Therefore,
in this sense, if Dasein opens itself to the truth of Being, it is condemned to be "Homeless"
The second meaning of the term "Homelessness" is found
in Heidegger's later works titled, Building Dwelling Thinking, Letter
on Humanism, and....Man Poetically Dwells... In these works it
appears that the meaning of homelessness is related to the notion
of Dwelling. If man dwells authentically, he understands his place
in the neighborhood of Being and feels at home. Man's feeling of
'homeness' is a result of understanding his place within the oneness of the fourfold (earth, sky, divinities, and mortals). Acknowledging the fourfold allows man to understand the truth about Being. "Dwelling is the basic characteristic of Being".' Therefore,
man's homelessness is a result of man's denial of this essential
characteristic. Unlike the fa nn er meaning discussed, in this context homelessness is a result of man closing himself off from Being by dwellin g improperly. Existing in the realm of the 'se lfcentered' common man or the 'They' denies the ultimate realities
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ofthe world. This, in esse nce, denies man's proper place on earth
as a mortal and denies the truth of Being.
To understand the com plete ramifications of the second
meanin g of the term "Homelessness", it is necessary to first state
Heidegger's defin ition of the term. This will allow a process of
working back towards the cause. In Heidegger's essa y titled, Letter on Humanism, "Homelessness " is defi ned as follows;
Homeless ness so understood consists in the aban-

donment of Being by beings. Homelessness is the
symptom of oblivion of Being. Because of it thetruth
of Being remains unthought. The oblivion of Being
makes itself known indirectly through the fact that
man always observes and handles only beings(LH
p. 242) 7
According to Heidegger, man is home less because man does not
think in terms of Being. Man lives in such a way that he denies the
truth of Bei ng. Therefore, in order to reli eve the fee ling of
homelessness, man must acknowledge the fundamental qu estion
of Being and open itself up to it. The way in which man is able to
achieve this is ex plained by Heidegger in the follow ing passage.
Thinking builds upon the house of Being, the house
in which the jointure of Being fatefully enjoins the
essence of man to dwell in the truth of Being. This
dwelling is the essence of Being-in-the-world.'
According to Heidegger, dwelling (Being-in-the -world) is the fundamental charac teris tic of man that enables him to open himself to
the truth of Being. The key to relieving homelessness resides in
the way in which man dwells on earth. Therefore , an analysis of
the meaning of dwelling will lead to the cause and remedy of
homelessness.
The meaning of the word dwelling, according to Heidegger,
is disco vered through an analysis of Language. The German word
'bauven', which means to build, also implies to dwe ll. Dwelling
consis ts of building, cultivating, res iding, and giv ing care. Care
involves , in this sense, 'letting be free ' . This freedom implies a
sense of 'safeguarding from mischief and threats'. To be 'safeguarded from', implies to be spared. According to Heidegger, to
be spared implies a sense of taking care of or being taken care of.
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace
withinthe free, the preserve, the free sphere that safe-
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guards each thing in its essence. The fundamental
character of dwelling is this sparing. It pervades
dwelling in its whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we recall that human beings
consist in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense
of the stay of mortals on the earth.'
If man is properly dwelling then he is sparing everything within
the openness to Being. Everything, in this sense, means the world.
Proper dwelling allow s things to be the way they are; a product of
the fourfold. To spare a thing, implies to spare the fourfold; earth ,
sky, gods, and morta ls. Therefore, dwelling can be defmed as being open to the world in a manner in which man underst ands the
ultimate realities of the world .
Things, whether man made or natural, are result s of the
interplay between the fourfold. By sparing thing s, man is opening
himself to the world of earth, sky, gods and mortals. According to
Heidegger, it is 'things' that are respon sible for showing the real ities of the world to us, there fore, by sparing thing s, we spare these
ultimate realitie s. Heidegger claim s that if man spares things under the influence of the fourfo ld then man will live in the neig hborhood of which everything begins. "Mortals are in the fourfo ld by
dwelling?" This neighbo rhood , the neighborhood of Being, is the
foundation for man 's feeling of "Homeness",
However, existing in the neighborhood of Being can only
be attained by sparing th ings. Unfortu nately, accord ing to
Heidegger, modern man does not exist in this neighborhood. Therefore, man is esse ntially homeless. Modern man lives in a world
that is considered to be a man made world. The things of modern
man do not reflect the fourfold, from which everything comes, but
reflects the self-centered happiness of man. The modern world
suppresses things in such a way that they are not allowed to be
what they essentially are; fundamental realitie s of the world . When
these fundame ntal realities are den ied, man becomes homeless. Not
for lack of a house, but because he does not properly spare. Not
properly sparing things is a result of not dwelling in the proper
sense of Dwe lling.
Althoug h Heidegger claims that modern man is essentially
homeless, there does seem to be, unlike the first meanin g, a rem edy that will allow man to be at home . Exist ing within the neighborhood of Being is realized through dwelli ng properly. By spar-
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ing things, the ultimate realities of the world are revealed to us and
we can become 'at home' in their neighborhood. The process in
which this movement can occur is in thought itself. The problem,
according to Heidegger, is that "dwelling is not experienced as
Man 's Being; Dwelling is never thought of as the basic characteristic of a human being:" Therefore , if man changes his thinking,
by opening itself to the fundamental question of Being, by caring
for, and saving the earth, then man can become at home within the
ultimate realities of the world. If man thinks about Being instead
of beings, man will reside in the neighborhood of Being which is
the foundation of homeness.
If the above explanatio ns of the meanings of the term
"Ho rnelessness" are correct, one is left with the question, "what
did Heidegger intend to imply with his opposing descriptions of
the feeling of homelessness?" The first type of homeless ness is
described as being a result of opening oneself to Being, whereas,
the second type is a consequence of closing oneself off from Being. The first implies that the realm of the common man is home
while the latter implies that the neighborhood of Being is home.
However, in both cases man is condemned to be homeless. In the
first case, by accepting it's Being-towards-death, Dasein frees up
it' s possibilities and becomes authentic. However, the feeling of
homelessness drives Dasein back towards the comm unity and once
again becomes lost in the "they" . In the second case, Heidegge r
alludes to a remedy for the phenomena of homelessness, but it remains unclear how changing one's thinking about Being will bring
about an authentic existence. If we are "thrown" into a man made
world, changing the way we think about Being will not change
that fact. Furthermore, the very nature of the type of thinkin g
Heidegger is alluding to is beyond what I can put into words. Therefore, since man cannot escape the feeling of homelessness, man
must be inherently condemned to be homeless. The Being of Dasein,
by its very nature, is destined to be inauthentic.
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Endnotes
I In Being and Time, Heidegger refers to Man as Dasein, however, in his later works Dasein is replaced with man. Therefore,
in reference to his later works, like Heidegger, I will use the
word man instead of Dasein.
' The word "uncanniness" is derived from the Germa n word
"Unheimlich" which also means uneasiness and "not-at-home".
The word can also be referred to as "Unheimlichkeit" which
means Homeless ness. By adding the ending "Keit", the word
changes from an adjective to a noun , which changes the meaning. Heidegger makes this transition often, so in the first part of
this paper I am going to use the word Unheim lichkeit instead of
Unheimlich.
Heidegger, Being and Time. Translated by Macquarrie and
Robinson. Harper/Collins, San Francisco: 1962. H. 188
3 Ibid. H. 189
'Ibid. H. 189
' Ibid. H 189
• Heidegger. Basic Writings, "Building Dwelling Thinking" .
Translated by David Krell, Harper publishing, San Francisco ,
1993. pg. 362.
' Heidegger. Basic Writings, "Letter of Human ism ". Translated
by David Krell. Harp er publishing , San Francisco: 1993 edition.
Pg.242 .
'Ibid., pg. 259-60
9Heidegger. Basic Writings, "Building Dwe lling Thinking".
Trans lated by David Krell. Harper publishing, San Francisco:
1993 edition pg. 351
IOIbid., pg. 252
11 Ibid .• pg.350
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The Ethics of Resistance
Melanie Morra
San Jose State University

The intention of this paper is to connect Foucault's ethics,
which is an aesthetics, to his idea of resistance. Resistance to what?
Resistance to norma lization which penetrates our most personal
relations. The first part of the paper wil1 aim to reflect a deep
skepticism of practi ces accepted as continuous and progressive
truths; by looking at how we have come to inherit these pract ices,
and the effects they might have on the individual. History brings
light to our current power relations, which must be understood as
the means of resistance. These power relations, via j udiciary and
disciplinary powers can de-emphasize our ability to make ethical
choices independent of authoritative norms. I wil1 analyze power
through the two-fold explanation explored in Two Lectures focusing on the specifics of our era. The second section wil1 aim to
reveal ethics as the relationship you have to yourself within the
power/knowledge matrix. Resistance can then be seen as a truly
unique understanding of choices made against a backdrop of the
normalizing society. In the final analysis resistance emerges as the
art of self-fashioning and care ofthe self.
The assumptions that we are making progres s, and that the
sciences have authoritative knowledge are challenged by Foucault's
early wor k. He examines the practices of psychology and medicine, and scrutinizes the methods of the prisons, popular culture
and the nuclear family. He suggests that these act as terminals of
power, shaping the personal ities, preferences, and practices ofhuman beings. In a sense, one could say that to normalize is to disempower, to dictate identity and control actions through indirect
means. For examp le within the nuclear family role models dictate
to the children what the preferences and habits wil1 be. The male
child wil1prefer blue jeans and play with trucks . The female child
wil1prefer pink dresses and play with Barbie.
Foucault painstakingly constructs a historical account of
madness , the clinic, and the prison to reveal the hapha zard way,
which our practices come to be given authority in the form of institutions. The power to treat people resides within these establish-
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ments because they seem to have special knowledge. Let me begin with an example given in the Birth of the Clinic. As a woman,
this particular example will allow me to elaborate many aspec ts of
the powerlknowledge relationsh ip interpreted in the early works
on history that leav e so many readers wondering what Fouc ault is
doing. We have the beginning formations ofa patient who is merely
a site for medical condit ions . The attempt is to alleviate the condition, regardless of the per son. The patient is soon to disintegrate,
rep laced by a subj ect to which study, statistics and analysis apply;
a subject to make normal according to this very science:
Towards the middle of the eighteen th century,
Pomme treated and cured a hysteric by making her
take ' baths, ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole
months' . At the end of this treatment for the desiccation of the nervous system and the heat that sustained it, Pomme saw 'membranous tissues like

pieces of damp parchment... peel away with some
slight discomfort, and these were passed daily with
the urine; the right ureter also peeledaway andcame
out whole in the same way'. The same thing occurred with the intestines, which at another stage,
'peeled off theirinternal tunics, whichwe say emerge
from the rectum' (BCxi).
The first thing that strikes me about the passage is that the woman
has no name, in fact she is simp ly ' a hysteric'. This type ofreduction leads me to assume that the physician does not recognize a
patient, but merely a condi tion. There does not seem to be a substantia llink between excessive soaking and an actua l cure for anything. How are we even to imagine that a human would be treated
like this? I hav e assumed ' cured' means damaged more seve rely.
The powerlkn owledge complex is served, for we now kn ow the
result of severe bath ing. The individual has their perso nal power
taken away; they are treated to make them fit the norm .
Clearly, the physician is experimenting on the patient. How
is this supposed cure scientifically related to hysteria? Well, the
knowledge of the physician is red uced to a sort of rhetoric, a discourse. Whatever rationalization made sense at the time, the history of the clinic show s the earl y operation of powerlknowledge.
A person goes to the doctor to be mad e normal by the powe rlknowledge of the medical practices. We actually vo lunteer to be sub-
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jected to this form of authority by going to the doctor and saying,
"1 am not normal",
Later, in the History of sexuality, we learn that women are
predisposed to hys teria. As a woman, I know not to come across
as anything less than a rational and productive citizen. Thi s is not
because I fear that I will be soaked in hot water until I forget that I
am hysterical and realize that now. Instead , my intestines are peeling and coming out of my rectum. These days , I will be given a
pill that makes me appear normal when I am not vomiting and
having mild side effects like migraine headaches and loss of
memory. The power relation exists jus t as it did when women
were soaked. Only the appearance of the power relation has
changed . Medicine is just one example ofpowerlknowledge . As
medici ne progre sses, it becomes more and more clear what is "normal." Authority is exercised over the individual in an attempt to
make them fit the se norms.
This is in fact, a history of the medical clinic. How does it
funct ion in the normalization of a population? The relation has
many layers. The doctor gathers statistical informatio n on what is
common and what is not, and simultaneously dispenses prescriptive measures for the patient. A certain heart rate is consi dered
norm al, temperature, hours of sleep, digestive time, when some one does not fit the norm, efforts begin right away to make them
right. Western medicine assume s that everybody has essentially
the same body. The clinic is only one example of normalizing
techno logies. The early works reveal several assumptions that we
make about power, and perhaps more importantly, that we are never
outside of powerlknowledge relations. When power/knowledge
takes an office, such as a doctor or politician, it becomes a power
terminal, these terminals are all aroun d us. Normalization appears
as a dominant theme, surfacing with bourgeois ethics aimed at
maintaining mass production. It seems specific to our era that
powerlknowledge is so precisely aimed at controlling and dictating actions of individuals and entire populations. Foucault says:
I don't think anyone can find any normalization in, for
instance, the stoic ethics. The reason is, I think, that

the principle target of this kind of ethics, was an aestheticone. First, this kindof ethicswas only a problem
of personal choice. Second, it was reserved for a few
people in the population; it was not a question of giv-
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ing a pattern of behaviorfor everybody. It was a personal choice for a small elite (E 254).
Foucault does not aim to turn us back to some glorious time in
history that has answers for us in a nonnative sense. He questions
where ideas come from, and where they go. In identifying the aim
ofthe stoic ethic, and its method, one might want to make simi lar
consideration about our own system. Foucault associate s the normalizing society that we are in now with a specifically new type of
power, disciplinary powe r. This power is directed at the body, and
at limiting the possibilities of the body as a source of self-expression and self-creation . It is the limitations that are placed on the
body specifically that disconnec t us from ourselves. In other word ,
every aspect of my most personal self relations, how I care for my
body, how I seek pleasure -all of these can be dictated to me by my
family, my doctor, my peers, advertisements, the guard... This leaves
little room for me to decide how I will express myself through my
body. Again , Fouc ault's historical pictures are not meant to give a
prescription, prescrip tions are prec isely what he intends us to resist.
The two-fold analysis of powe r will allow us to analyze
and integrated structure in two parts . The word structure must be
clarified so that it is not understood as fixed or definite but rathe r
in a state of constant adaptation . It is configured and described as
if it where a very efficient and mobile mechanism of control in a
great conspiracy. Yet we find that it is anonymous. There is no
great conspirator, but the omnipresence of power is evident in every relation. It controls, dictates, defines and predicts. Some of
Foucault' s early work casts a heavy shadow of doubt on freedom ,
and presents a determined and bleak picture with no identity for
the individual. I will analyze power esjudiciary and disciplinary.
Judiciary power has a long lineage . It surfaces as assumptions like natural rights, leading to contractu al authoritative agree ments like our collective sovereignty. Laws tell us what is accept able, unacceptable and forbidden. There is no self-reflection or
self-fashioning invoked in the mechanisms of law as a subject of
it. We are not invited, or encouraged to speculate and act freely.
Our laws specifically still bear the make of monarchs. We still
relate to the power of the state as it were above us, forcing and
dominating our behavior. On the basis of this relation we miscon-
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strue power altogether. This form of power seemingly only dictates only represses. In every interaction and every choice that one
might be faced with , it can seem as though there is already a law
dictating it to us, and no actual choice to be made . Foucault will
challenge us to accept power in a who le new way, that allows for
choice, self-fashioning and tran sformation.
D isciplinary power in its current form is particular to more
recent societies. Discourses and practices that bel ong to disciplinary power arc evident in every aspect of our daily lives. The psychiatrist that prescribes shock treatment and the bodily discipl ine
developed in a student who faces forward and holds his urges to
move around are both examples of the disciplinary aspect of normalizing power. The aim is to crate a useful productive bod y of
workers who do not waste time or vital energy. This directly intends to limit and regulate sexual activity.
Modem society, then, from the nineteenth century up

to ourown day, has been characterized on the one hand,
by a legislation, a discourse, and organization basedn

public right, whose principle of articulation is the socialbody andthe delegativestatus of each citizen, and,
on the other hand, by a closely linkedgrid of disciplinary coercion whose
purpose is in fact to assure the cohesion of this same

social body (PK 106).
We arc in a sense, fitted into the powerlknowledge matrix as a
conductor with a limited range of possibi lities appar ent, yet there
are always hidden aspects to power. What myths does Foucault
aim to dispel about pow er relations? Power does not only dominate as a monarch might. Power does not come from the town
down in a repressive fashion, but rather goes form the bottom up.
Power relations exist everywhere, and they are not rigid or fixed.
Our personal , everyday lives should reflect a sense of this power,
and exerci se of choice. In our most intimate relations we shou ld
not feel the presence of the state as a dictator to which we own
loyalty:
Forcenturies we have been convinced that between our

ethics, our personal ethics, our everyday life, and the
great political social and economic structures, there
were analytical relations and that we couldn't chant
anything, for instance, in our sex life or our family life,
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without ruining our economy, our democracy, and so
on. I think we have to get rid ofthis idea of an analyticalor necessary link between ethics and other social or
economic or political structures (E 26 I).

Personal relations are most closely connected to the omnipresence
of power, or its transformative element. We need to understand
power as being all around us from mom ent to moment. No relation, no thought exists outside of the matrix, but Foucault' s aim is
to change our inherited view of power as repressive to a relationship of transformation. We need to distinguish the terminal forms
power takes form the omnipresence of powe r. Terminals operate
over a given domain, they are intentional and they have a purpose.
They might begin with an assumption that leads to an office or
bureaucracy that is a support in the network ofpower. An example
might be as simple as an assumpt ion based on the right to private
property. Assume more specifically, that each person has the right
to own a car, a regulating agency such as the DMV comes into
practice, to regulate and maintain the assu med right. At the same
time, we ent er into the labyrinth of power even deepe r. The
Panopticon probes in further with seemingly innocuous questions
that we are required, by law, to answer. Make, model, year, forms
ofinsurance, driv ing tests, all ofthese lead us to disclose our information such as inco me or color preference. Furthermore we are
disciplined to stand in line, to follow procedure. Terminal forms
of power appear to be mere mechanisms of law and discipline,
which do not so direc tly relate to transformation, but they can be
transformed. If everyone who drives a car refused to stand in this
line, went through with getting tickets, and finally resorted to riding
a bike-the state wo uld lose enough money that some sort of reform
would be made. Terminals are receptive, because power is at the
bottom, in the people .
The fact that each terminal is a separate entity is an illusion. It may appear that the doctor's office and the DMV are separate, but on the deeper level ofpower relations there exists no space
between them that is part of the network . Res istance then, is as
deeply imbedded in the network as is knowledge, ultimately residing in the actions of each individual. Ifpower is everywhere, so is
the potential for resistance. Subjects of power/knowledge must
dissolve the notion that resistance goes against or overthrows power
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and liberate s. This has no meaning. You cannot get outsid e of
power - it is inconceivable. How would the question of existence
even be formed outside of a discourse? How would one contemplate the mean ing of self, or being outside of the field of relations
and outs ide of a language game? If one attempts to answer either
question, an assumption about being that precedes existence is
made; a metaphysic is invoked.
I have alwaysbeen somewhat suspicious ofthe notion
of liberation, because if it is not treated with precau-

tions and within certain limits, one runs therisk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature
of base that, as a consequence of certain historical,
economic, and soci al processes, has been conceale d,

alienated, or imprisoned by mechanisms of repression
(E 282).
Our notion ofpower as repressive melts away when it is associated
to the possibility of resi stance-but why must we give up this wild
notion of liberation and what is left of resistance witho ut it? One
must overcome this way of think ing. There is not black or white,
that is to say extreme repression, or absolute liberation. Neither of
these is the case in reality. Without multi-faceted power relations
there is simply nothing. Any conception ofa utopian state assumes
universal s and that would marginalize those who had a different
idea.
The idea of liberation is very dangerous. While it can be
used to promote assumptio ns about human nature, assumptions
about human nature are precisely what fuels the mechan isms of
power, whether as repress ive or as resistance. The idea ofnormal ization as the means to the ends of a liberated and ideal society is
the most dangerous possibility. The mechanisms of power will
never be overcome, diffused, or gotten rid of, as I could not form a
mean ingful sentence without them . In the mean time, the ideal is
used as a mechanism of ultimate repression. An assumption of a
universalizable human nattrre contradicts the elements of self-fashioning as a true ethics possible only in a field of powerlknowledge
relations:
Taking care of oneself requires knowing [connaitre]
oneself. Care of the self is, of course, knowledge
[connaissance] of the self-this is the Socratic-Platonic
aspect- but also knowledge ofa number of rules ofac-
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ceptable conduct or of principles that are both truths
and prescriptions. To take care of the self is to equip
oneself with the truths: This is where Ethics is linked
to the game of truth(E 285).
Now what have we left of the notion of resistance? Well, since it is
bound to power, it must take place in relation . The second part of
the requirement listed above entails that we become aware of how
the power/knowledge mechanisms function in our society. The first
requirement seems lost to our day and age.
What could the Socratic-Platonic mean to the post-modern world? I venture two responses that may seem separate but are
very integrated. First, the regimens of the care of the self. The
presentation of these ideas in the History of Sexuality, Volume
Three ; Care of the Self discusses regime ofthe self. It is as though
care of the self is a ritualistic process, a religious process. The
body is treated with complete respect, as the inhabitant realizes
that the body is the primary root of the existence. The second way
of explaining this relation to the self is as a process of inquiry,
much like Socrates investigated philosophical matters, so we arc
to investi gate the care of the body (this includes pleasure of). Are
not the original ventur es of philosophy concerned with the good
life? Certainly the good life, first and foremost, requires a healthy
and cared for body. The care of the self on the one hand, had that
Socratic-Platonic element, the element that does not change, although it may appear to. Let me liken this to the omnipresence of
power so that I may claim it is directl y relevant to us today. The
second part of the requirement seems to refer to the termin als of
power in play within the context of the specific era, and even further, with the station of the individual. The way in which the individual appears to appeal to the norms , the ability to go along with
the program or prescription determines the status. This links the
ethical subject to the social context and power/knowledge matrix
in an active sense . In our time, discipline of the body plays the
most effectiv e role. More precisel y our relation to our body and
how we choose to use it define who we are; "The logic of sex is
the key to personal identity in our time. Our sexuality reveals to us
ourselves, and our desire to have this secret self-know ledge revealed drives us to engage in discourse on our sexuality" (Gutting
149). The care of the self is a very private matter. The care of the
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selfas resistance carries a communal connotation . Once we change
the primary way in which we relate to the self, the way in whi ch
we relate to other s is supposed to follow-it is an unfoldin g process.
It is within the power/kno wledge relationship dominantly
misconstrued as repressive power (form top down), that the individual becomes an object - something that is form ed and created
by an outside influence. I apply the same criteria to the self as we
do the objects: limited purpose, permanent characteristics, one-sided
relations, and a creator, or keeper that governs. I am so saturated
in this rhetoric that the relation of the self to the self is permeated
with it.
Wehave hardly any remnant of the idea in our society
that the principal work of art which one must take care
of, the main area to which one must take care of, the
main area to which one must apply aesthetic values in

oneself, one's life, one's existence (E 271).
It is with this relation that resistance must begin . At first a very
personal and individual relation of resistanc e, once everyone is
doing it, we can begin to take this new way of relating into public.
It is first personal because our sexuality is ultim ately our own secret, we may choose to hide it, discipline and conform it, or we
may flaunt it in order to liberate others who have a similar secret,
It begins with simple realizations . I am not the woman propagated
by pornography, nor am I the hysterical woman. Although, I believe that what the rational cpisteme Interprets as hysterical is more
clearly understood as Dionysian, and so I enter the Appollonian
discourse to inve rt the it.
As we begin to cultivate a self that does not always fit the
molds prescribed by the society, we resist normalization. The thing
about resistance is that it cannot really be pinn ed down, defined
and linked to a spec ific reference point for all of time. Resistance
in our era may not resemble the resistance of another peri od. Ifthe
aim of the dominant paradigm is to normalize, mas s produce, and
consume, resistance means at first to identify with the marginalized
populations, and to resist buying things in order to define yourse lf
by your possessio ns. The adoption of the notion of the self as a
creative process presents one with choices rather than prescrip tions. It opens the possibilities of being. If one believes that power
trickles from the top down, and relates to the self as a clo sed ob-
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ject, the result will only reinforce the mechanisms of normalization. Thro ugh his criticism of medicine, the asylum, the penitentiary, and the discipline of bodies (which are always sexual), Foucault uncovers a process "that he came to call ' normalization,' a
narrowing and impoverishment of huma n possibilities" (Gutting
143). Foucault suggests that we have options, that we need not
limit our bodies and therefore our identities to what is prescribed.
Foucault offers four aspects of self-relation. The first is
ethical substance or moral aspects of behavior. This ethical substance has changed through time. It seems to be very relative;
something that one comes to in addressing the situation not through
rationa lity, but through feelings. The second aspect is situational.
We, as subjects are called upon or invited to act morally. We are
given circumstances that call on us to consider our possibilities
and take action. This aspect of relatin g to the self ties the self to
the surrounding and to politics. Whenever we take action, we involve others. The third aspect is the practice of molding the ethical substance through action. This is a formation or practice of
ethics, but also of self. Any action is, in this sense ethica l. We
either create ourse lves, or we act in a way, which is benign. The
fourth aspect is the overall design , perhaps a form or a mode . I like
to formulate it as the projection of the project of the self. (E 264).
By living according to the pres criptions of the norm alizing society we play a role in enforcing these roles, and ultimately
fail to recognize and relate to the self. I am, in a sense, a pow er not
only unto myse lf, but also to those around me. If I react in shock
or disgust at someone who expresses them in an abnormal way, I
essent ially am part ofthe normalizing technology. There is a sense
in which I am obligated to encourage others to exercise their options and identify with them as a free person.
It seems that individuals actually do power the mechanisms
of normalization. Each of us makes a primary choice. You can go
with the program, represent, reinforce and perpetrate the network.
Although, it seems that no one is really normal, no one really identifies purely with the normal types set our by the system. This is in
fact, partly why it works to repress-by playing on feelings of guilt
and abnormality; certain tendencies may be hidden. If what ever
' it' is kept hidde n, other people will not fmd reflection in the community, and they will hide "it" to. This is a closing of being start-
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ing with the self and carrie d out through ones relations. If, on thc
other hand I recognize my own homosexual tendencies are not reflected in the society, and I nurture these feelings anyw ay, and let
people know about them , then I provi de a poi nt of validation for
other homosexual people. This pro vides an opening, a choice.
It seems as though once a person took on the task of selffashioning, thei r relations would invoke and inspire those around
them. It seems that it is time to work out an Ethics that is not based
on any assumptions about huma n nature, because those who do
not identify w ith those assumptions are sacri ficed. At one point or
another, everyone would find that they could not relate to the assumptions of human nature because the human being is not fixed ,
but rather in process. An Ethics ofAest hetics ofthe selfhas a lot to
offer to a normalized society. The ability to tune into ones ow n
feelings and iden tity and form these from a position of power,
wherein the context is merely the backdrop and support systemAesthetics of the self offers a muc h greater margin of person al
freedom than following the prescriptions enforced by the soci ety.
It also allows the possibility of playing an active role in op ening
the possibilities of ethical being to others .
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Thoughts on Feminism and Human Values
JimDix
San Jose State University

Corning , as I do, from that part of society that had heen
and perhaps still is most favored , saying anything at all on topics
such as this may not be worth much. As Donna Haraway observes ,
the dominant perspective is blind to what it has subjected. But it is
just because of this point that I'd like to offer a few words of encouragement. Let me take as a starting point these two perspectives, ackno wledging that they are not mon olithic representatives
of their respective species. Then, in supposing the goal toward which
we all are seeking in this area is to remove all dominant and subjected perspectives on values and to reach a point where we all
share a human perspective on them, I will contend that this can be
reached without requiring anything of the dominant perspective
other than the granting of political equalities.
In con sideration of this objective, what I will be discussing is a journey, though it will not be one in which I will bring out
details of the scenery along the way. It is a journey because, like all
journeys, it must begin from where we are today, even as we recognize that so me path led us there. In effect , what I would like to
do is to characterize how the journey has to be represented . I think
we are to some degree already on that journey, but that there is
sufficient confusion in the paths to take that the best we can say is
that we are ineffic iently advancing to our goal. Even so, the path I
am advocatin g will not be seen as a "short-cut," since, even if we
could adopt it, it will take some time to implement and, in any
case, practical concerns may limit the options. So what kind of
pathway am I talking about? In the area of human values, I advocate advancing the cause of the women's separatist movement, and,
at the same time , I advocate maintaining pressure on the political
side of the movement toward full integration and accommodation.
I begin with an observation that many in my dontinant
position have heard, though perhaps with less stridency than in
earlier times, from feminists, which is: "men have to change ." By
this is meant that times have changed, and certain attributes with
which men are endowed, such as physical strength, simply are no
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longer needed. Violence is no longer acceptable. Men need to
change their ways, adopting new patterns of responses to daily
challenges. But more than this, these feminists mean to change
men' s attitudes about themselves, and about those women who cater
to men, and for men to draw upon other qualities that will put some
balance in their systems of values. Indeed, some have gone so far
as to think that men ought to adopt values traditionally acceptable
only to wome n.
Becau se of the orient ation of at least thi s part of the
women's movement, we see pressure on the advertising and entertainment industries to portray men in other than traditional ways,
less dominant than they'd been in earlier times. The idea behind
this is that a consistent image can over time make substa ntial
changes in attitudes. These institutions, unless checked by pressure from feminism, would tend to reinforce old traditional values
just because of the dominant position that men hold in those industries. Furthermore, as we hear from time to time, "stud ies have
shown" that these industries have great int1uence over the attitudes
that members of society have toward others. If, for exa mple, a
woman is being portrayed as submissive toward a man this is taken
to mean that viewe rs would come to find it acceptable for a woman
to be submiss ive toward a man .
It is here that I begin to interject my doubts about this "political correctness" theory of manipu lation of attitudes. While I
suspect it can have some success, it' s not clear to me that it will be
a lasting one, or that it will achieve the right outcome . If, in order
to change men's attitudes, men need to be cast as sheep under the
influence of women's manipulation, my sense is that this may only
resurrect latent stereotypes regarding women's manipulative skills.
The message delivered by the media will not necessarily be the
message that is received. Indeed, it is because these messages are
seen as "political correctness," deliverin g them loses all their force
with respect to changing attitudes. The messages will have to be
made with grea ter subtlety to have their effect. However, this "psychological" approach to attitude change brings with it the danger
that men will revolt as they begin to see through it. If, to counter
this, such messages are backed by legislation, men may wind up
being under siege in fear of some lawsuit or damage to reputation
all in the name of having standards of political correctness. I see
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this form of handling men as at least highly inefficient in achieving the goal of establishing basic human values. What is needed
instead is a complete rethinking of the entire edifice that is our
mutual system of values.
So how would I begin the journey? Well, I think it has to
begin within each of us, but at present, men have no inclination or
reason to do so. At present, the situation is such that men patroni ze
women and women have learned to expect this treatment, or if
they do not they merely get upset with men that do. To counter
this, women have to tum the tables. Collectively, and separate from
men, women have to establish a foundation of values on which
every aspect of our lives is to be oriented. To accomplish this,
women ought not to care a whit about what men have to say. There
is just no need for women to receive acknowledgement or recognition from men about their ideas at all. Women, in working out their
own systems of values, ought to do it in the same way that men did
when they worked out theirs - merely assume that these values
are the values of the entire society. What is important outright is
what women themselves come up with - without consultation
with men.Women ought to abandon all efforts at integration of ideas.
This may be too strong a position to take in that women
may want to extract from what men have said about values just so
that they can select or reject from them , but the objective here is to
establish a finn foundation on which all human values can be developed . Such a task taken up on this journey is not limited to any
particular interest area. Everything has to be considered - including the entire panoply of human values: ethics, aesthetics, economics, politics, social, personal, familial, communal, spiritual. This
ought to be done even if it means creating separate women-domi. nated organizations for each of them. There is just no reason to
worry about what men think is important because, in this part of
the women's movement, men are but objects of consideration towards which a set of systematic acco unts is being developed.
Women should resist the temptation to have men recognize their
achievements. Seeking recognition is the source of the problem . It
has the effect of giving men the opportunity of reviving their own
dominant position. The thrust of all this is that what is needed to
achieve the goal is to develop a dominant women's perspective
from what is now only a subjected one. As this progresses and
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women begin to draw upon the best ideas from other women, they
will no longer need to consult with men. Then, in the course of
time, men will come to take notice of this state of affairs.
Of course, as this is happening, women, like men, will
become just as patronizing as men are. Power, even if it is only
based on what is perceived as superiority of ideas, does tend to
corrupt. All the worst that derives to men's attitudes would show
up in women as well, despite any historical roots of genuine inquiry. Indeed, I think this ought to happen, or at least it ought to
begin to happen. This "equality of patronization" will have the effect of creating an equality of men and women overa ll, I believe.
This is because patronization itself and the sins accruing to attitudinal shifts of this sort will be diminished, just because it will be
seen as a human fault, not just a man's. That is, while patronization
will not disappear, since I believe it is a human characteristic, its
importance will be undermined by its not being strictly paternal.
As indicated above, this strategy is not supposed to reduce
the effort within the political side of the movement that demands
equality in public office, the work place, or in places of power in
society. I should imagine it might even help in defming the issues
within this part of the movement. The essential point is that there
should be no let up until full political equality is achieved. Where
I believe women go wrong is to assume that the media and entertainment world s are instruments of power over and above these
other areas. While I would grant that there is some power exercised by these sectors of society, I believe they are more likely to
be followers than leaders. For the most part, they merely magnify
the values already present in targeted sectors of society and are
subject to being transformed as the target changes. I think a good
case can be made for applying pressure to those groups who target
impressionable youths and children, but otherwise I think it better
to leave folks alone . By focusing on their own contributions to the
human endeavor, women will cause the media to follow suit. If
women want to target attitudes and values that folks hold within
these industries, I suggest they establish their own network the
purpose of which would be to address human interests but in such
a way that it is not "message driven" in the manipulative sense that
I think is unproductive. Instead, it should be a forum for the discussion of human values, as elucidated by women.
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In conclusion, the consc ious ness-raising efforts of the
women's movement to change men, I believe, are misguided, when
they do so by way of manipulation. Women ought to focus their
efforts on developing their own separate systems of values, at least
until the day in which there exists an equality of attitude toward
the other sex. Instead of pushing men, such a strategy drags men to
this better world in their wake.
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S J S U SYMPOSIUM
God as a SETI Being
Dirk Bruins
San Jose State University
The following essay won an essay contest in which the topic
question was: "Should God be a factor in the scientific search for
extra-terrestrial intelligence?"
INTRODUCTION
There are three obscure problems with the topic question
at hand. First is the problem of interpretation. Is the question
asking : "Should scientists who are searching for extraterrestrial
intelligencetake God into account?"! or is it asking: "Can the search
for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) find God?" I interpret the
question in the latter sense. To forgo the second problem, and to
prevent a diversion into proofs for God 's existence, it is assumed
that God exists. The third problem is coming up with an agreeable
definition of God. This problem presents too formidable a task.
Instead, I will first determine the characteristics that a being, which
SETI is capable of detecting, must necessarily possess-this I will
call a SETI being .' Next, the necessary characteristics of a SETI
being will be compared with the more "popular" characteristics
often ascribed to God. By examining the problem in this way the
reader is also able to compare the characteristics of his or her "personal'" God with those of a SETI being . In the end, if the characteristics of a SETI being are indeed attributable to God, or to the
reader's "personal" God, then the answer to the topic question must
be yes, God should be a factor in the scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence. The answer will be no if the characte ristics of
a SETI being are not attributable to God. However, the [mal answer, as we shall see, is more complicated than a simple yes or no.
ASETIBEING
The SETI Institute funds and runs Project Phoenix, whose
goal "is to discover evidence of extraterrest rial civilizations through
detection of microwave signals generated by their technology"
(SETI). Conveniently listed on the SETI website are "the characteristics of the Targeted Search System,'" which include (SETI) :
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"se arch for artificial signals that: have a narrow bandwidth
«300 Hz) may be highly polarized drift in frequency by
less than 10-9 Hz/seclHz may be continu ously present or
pulsed
search the ' Microwave Window' from 1 GHz to 3 GHz
observe approx imately 1000 sun-like stars within a distance of 150 light years" (SET!).

In summary, a SETI being (I) lives near a sun-like star that is
(2) within 150 light years fro m Earth, (3) broadcasts microwaves
between I GHz and 3 GHz with a (4) highly polarized frequency
that are (5) con tinuous or pulsed. Are these characteristics comparable with those of God?

GOD
Charac teristics "popularly" ascri bed to God include omnipotence , omniprese nce , omnibenevolent and omniscience. At
first sight these characteristics seem vastly different than those of a
SETI being. After all, God's characteristics are about power, spatial position, benevolence and knowledge, and a SETI bein g's characteristics are about very specific microwaves coming from very
specific locations. The characteristics see m incomparable and the
answer to the topic question seems to be no, God should not be a
factor in the scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence.
Before j umping to this hasty conclusion, however, note
that it is possible for a being to possess both the most often ascribed characteristics of God, as well as, those of a SETI being. In
short, the two sets of characteristics are not mutually exclusive.
Given God ' s characte ristics of omnip otence, omnipresence ,
omnibenevolence and omniscie nce, God could very well live or be
near a sun-like star that is within 150 light years from Earth, broadcast microwave signals betwe en I GHz and 3 GHz with a highly
polarized frequencies that are continuous or pulsed . Since this is
the case, God should be a factor in the scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence becaus e, strange and as implausible as it
seems, logical reasonin g proves that a bein g can both be God and a
SETI being at the same time.'
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LOGICAL?
The argument thus far has been deductive, and has yielded
an answer in the affirmative. BUI what does this answer, following
this type of reasoning , really mean? What it means is that there is
no logical inconsistency in supposing that if we ever receive extraterrestrial signals, they could come fro m God. It shows that SETI
is indeed capable of finding God . Th is logical answer, however, is
not very satisfying. It does not answe r the more interesting question: "Is SETI likely to find God?" I argue that, even though it is
logically possible for SETI to find God, SETI is not likely to do so,
and therefore God should not be a factor in the search. Two lines
of reasoning are presented : the absurdity argument and the beyond
human recognition argument.
THE ABSURDITY ARGUMENT
This argument boils down to the question : "W hy would
God contact humanity (or choose to be discovered) through SETI?"
A key assumption of this question is that it is poss ible for people to
have contact with God. Many religious people, most notably mystics, would argue that they have had experiences of contact with
God, and that the question is moot. For skeptics, however, the
question is not moot. Even the most stubborn atheist, when for
argument's sake accepts (not only God's existence, but also) the
assumption that contact with God is possible, will agree that it would
be utterly absurd for God to use SETI as the Holy Messenger.
Furthermo re, any theist, who has not had contact with God, is likely
to hold the same position. If God chose to be discovered or to
contact humanity, She or He would not do so through SETI.
THE BEYOND HUMAN RECOGNmON ARGUMENT
Eve n if we were to receive radio signals from God, would
SETI be able to recognize them? Recall that SETI only searches
for signals with logical patterns. (How else would they be recognizable?) But why should we assume that God's radio signals, if
She or He tran smits them, are logically organized into recognizable patterns? Mystics, who claim that they have had contact with
God, allege that their experiences are recognizable, but do not folIow a logical pattern ; instead, they are parado xical and illogical
(Stace). If we define reception of radio signal s from God as con-
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tact, then based on mystics' experiences, we cannot with good reason assume that the signals will follow a logically recognizable
pattern . These signals would therefore not be recognizable. For
all we know, SET! has been stari ng God straight in the face all this
time and doesn' t even know it!
... all attempts of the logical inte11ecl to comprehend
these mystical [experiences] lead only to insolvable
paradox (Stace, 2(0).
CO NCL USION
Log ical reaso ning leads us to believe that God should be a
factor in the scientific sea rch for extraterrestrial intelligence. Upo n
closer exam ination however, it see ms absurd for God to use SETI
as the Holy Messenger, and God's radio signals, if She or He indeed transmits them, will probably not be recog nizable. My final
answer, there fore, is that God should not be factor in the scientific
search for extraterrestrial intelligence.
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Endnotes
I From a Christian perspective the answer to this interpretation of the
question must be yes, God should be a factor in the scientific search for
extrate rrestrial intelligence. The Holy Bible make s several references to
the heavens being filled with angles and other intelligent creatures. For
example, see Hebrews 12:22 and Rev elation 5:II . I realize that this may
be a literal a reading of the scriptures. Nonetheless, it is a possible interpretation.
Furthermore, the fable ofthe Tower of Babe l is noteworthy. The
peop le, who all spoke one language, built a city and a "tower with its top
in the heavens" (Meeks, Gen 11:4). God objected that the people where
too powerful and "nothing that they propose to do will now be impossible
for them" (Meeks, Gen I I :6). So He thwarted their efforts by con fusing
their language and scatte ring them "over the face ofall the earth " (Meeks,
Gen I I :9). These references show at least some support for the case that
the heavens are filled with intelligent beings, and that God frowns upon
the search for him. Clearly SET! scientists should take this into consideration.
2 I realize that just as artificially generated inform ation sources on Earth
require the cooperative activity of many people, so by analogy we might
well expect this to be true of any artificially produc ed extra terrestrial information . However, considering the essay topic, the singular for of being is used since God by assumption is singular.
3 By personal, I mean both the standard definit ion of personal, as in,
one's own, as we ll as the reader 's or any other religion 's definition of
what God is or mig ht be.

The Targeted Search System "is a transportable SETI system that is
use d in conjunction with existing radio telescopes for high sensitivity
SETI observations. It is composed of several subsystems, eac h responsible for one aspect of the signal processing and con trolled by sophisticated software for highly automated operation" (SETI). The operations
4
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are "highly automated to minimize operator interact ion and increase the
quality and uniformity of the search" (SETI).
, If the characteristics of the reader's "personal" God do not agree with
the discussed "popular" characteristics, then the reader is encouraged to
do his or her own ana lysis and determine whether or not their God 's characteristics are mutually exclus ive with the characteristics of a SETI being. In most, if not all cases, the answer will be no; the sets of charac teristics are not mutually exclusive, and therefore, God should be a factor in
the scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence.

Thinking' as Commemorative"
Tony Nguyen
San Jose State University

How does one c om mem orale a Ihinker wh o an swers the
call to th inking, who' asks what is called thinking, who' calls on
you to think? One commemorates a composer by playing his son gs.
Can one playa thought like one plays a song? Can one record the n

The Language of a Call to Thinking.
2 In Being and Time, the authentication for the potential-for-being
comes as a call for conscience. The call is a type discourse that does
not require conceptualism. As a logos, the call illicits a response to
form a dialogue between the One and the Other. If the One finds itself
always limited to being what it is, then the Other lies in the open. The
call that calls into the open is not conceptual because it does not
delineate, define, limit and dictate an Idea. Nor does it dictate the
response. Not delineating, an open call does not excluded, and
suppress. The call , as a discourse, that does not master what it calls
forth.
l For a call, to be a call, the call comes from a voice. Not a universal
voice, but the single voice that calls, when it calls. This voice, once
heard can be reco gnized even with name or face. Who calls for the end
of philosophy and the beginning of philosophy? Who calls for us to
think? If distinct faces are forgotten then so much the better. To
constantly stand before your work and describe its workings is an
affront to mastery. When heard properly the thinker 's thoughts can be
found echoing in others works. Citations become irrelevant, as a true
Master disappears into their works and into the works of their followers.
A master who calls forth our thinking sets before us a task, but does not
require a specific response. Tasks?
• All tasks? To formulate a generality that captures all tasks would be
to conceptualize. This concept, this generalization, because it applies
to all really does not apply wholly to any particular. If we can't
conceptualize the task, what tasks are we faced with this call? In this
case, the call comes from the need to commemorate; to commemorate a
thinker who wishes us to be-with him. The call we hear is the call for
us to think with the thinker. If we answer this call and we think with
the thinker, then we've answered the call to thinking.
I
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rep lay a thou ght and call this th inking? Surely one does this when
one talks about' the thinker, and the thoughts that he thought. While
' Thinking links with talking . Logos beco mes central towards thinking. In Being and Time, Logos can be understood as "discourse",
"reason", 'judgement", "concept", "definition", "ground" or "relationship", Heidegger explicitly defines logos as "a letting-be-seen". As an
assertion, the Logos reveals beings, and lets them be seen. It lets see,
by first calling forth a certain type of being. It does this by framing

beings. A being is something that is. A framed being is a something
seen as something. By gathering these framed beings a thinker
discloses a certai n way of being in a world. What is that? A cup of
coffee? An admixture of caffeine and oils? Commodity? Investment?
Inventory? The names that we label that, point to different worlds that
that which is belongs to. A cup of coffee belongs to the everyday,
admixtures to chemistry, commodities, investments and inventories to
the world of moneymakers and producers of goods. Framed within an
idea, wrapped within a practical world we use wordsto assert truths
about the things we find in these human world s. The assertion, this
"concept of Logos" only explains the Logos of apophansis - of the
correspondence between words and world, fitted within a coherent
conceptual scheme. This is not what we desire presently, because the
logos that we are faced with now is a call. As a call, the logos does not
frame, however it still reveals the Being of beings. What is the Logos
of this call? Perhaps this is not the proper way to pose the quest ion
concerning the Logos of the call. To ask for a what, is to ask for a
definition. Once a definition is called for, we are forced to delineate
and conceptualize. We should not ask for a "co ncept" when we should
not to hark to a concept. If we cannot "co nceptualize" with our Logos,
how does ways can our Logos work?
Typically in philosophy, when one seeks to understan d a
thinker one conceptualizes their thoughts using assertions. Assertions
mainly describe . Assertions can be thought of as either synthetic or
analyticaL A syn thetic proposition asserts about states of affairs. If
synthetic propositions correspond to these states of affairs then those
assertions are true. Analytical propositions are true because the ideas in
these propositions cohere - they fit together in a way that does not lead
to a contradiction. Both synthetic and the analytic propositions form
the basis for prop ositional truth. Unfortunately, proposition reveal
beings only by describing. The "is" of apoph ansis is not the " ought" of
exhortation. Propo sitions do not prescribe ways of being nor do
fundamentally engage thinking.
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the thinker's thoughts may provide fertile grounds for yourthoughts,
th is approach yields no fru itful' thoughts. In talking about the
thinker, we cease to think about the thoughts. Instead of thinking
we gossip . What do we prove when we talk about the thi nker
except that they are human. Perhaps to think is to talk about the
thoug hts themse lves . Yet again though, this talking about takes us
away from the grounds that give to thinking. Instead of drawing
upon ourselves, our home, and our ground - the present ground we
inherit and find ourselves standing upon in our thoughts we cast
our eyes to distant shores hidden by the mi sty past. In talking
s We should give pause and listen to the "unfruitfulness" of our
direction. In one sense our"unfruitful" labors resonates with a main
metaphor found in Heidegger 's Memorial Address to Conradin
Kreutzer. Heidegger meditates on thinking as pomology. Pomology is
the science of growing fruit. Is thinking like growing fruit? We can
say that certain issues provide fertile ground for thought. We can say
that we can plant seeds of thought in people's minds, that take root,
blossom and bear results. Moreover, we can use this metaphor to

suggest what thoughtlessness entails. Heidegger 's pomology shows us
that the task of his thinking at-hand is the task of showing his people,
their home ground. This is necessary, because his people have grown
rootless. This rootlessness has turned the German people from a robust
nation of blood and earth, into one that has grown thougbtless. His
meditation grows from this metaphor, eventually bearing a conclusion
that shocks us. His people have grown technological, and thus lost
their connect ion with the Earth and to each other. Technological
thinking is thinking that reduces all being into concepts. Concepts
capture being by providing general definitions that describe what
something is. For a general concept to describe, it must exclude the
. particular characteristics of the individual members of the class it
names. The techno logical thinker thinks only in terms of concepts.
Doing so they are closer to their thoughts then to the Earth that gave
rise to that concept. Alienated from the grounds that give rise to
concepts, the technological thinker grows bloodless. I mention this, not
to say that we should think of the Logos of the call as pomology. To
say that Heidegger 's meditation is like growing fruit, is to confuse the
meditation with what it bore. Instead, I evoke it to remind my readers
that language does not always speak directly. As a pomology, language
does not assert. Instead it fosters, houses and grows. Metaphorical
thinking shows us an indirect logos. Is our call to thinking an indirect
way of speaking?

68

GEIST

about we rev iew the past and fo rget that th e livin g must live and
that the proble m s of life must not be talk about but be tho ught
th ro ugh . Talking about, re lives, and thus rel ieves the living from
the onus of thi nking' . In talks about thinking, the talker hope s that
by review, the thinker wi ll so mehow speak to them from the past' .

' If it were an indirect Logos, how would this indirectness show itself?
Clearly a Logos must gather, and in this gathering new possibilit ies
open for hum an beings. To gather is to bring together elements.
Besides the gathering of concepts, a logos can gather mnemonic ally
through alliteration. "Torelive, is to relieve the living" reminds us that
to think with the thinker means that we cannot take the monuments that
he has left behind as being the final answe r. This is especially true for
a thinker who thinks not for answers, but for questions. For a question
to be a question, the question must be forever open for renewed
questioning. This turns the questioning into something that pertain s to
the questioner. Since a questioner is always a living questioner, a
questioner that relies on answers suppl ied ready-at-hand does a great
disservice to questioning. Because of this. we must always bring
ourselves to the present - to the here and now if we take the task of
thinking with any amount of authentic resolution. When I call on you
to think, I do not call on you to think about another's thoughts.
, One form of inauthentic thinking arises from us trying to re-gather the
thinker's thinking . This Logos is clearly not the logos we seek for
when we try to hear the call to tbinking . This Logos does not articulate
anything new. Moreover it creates a strange paradox. This Logos of
talking about is commentary. Cliff notes, footnotes and other 's gossips
and chatter are forms of commentary. A commentary presupposes that
what it comments on is both complete and incomp lete. The "main"
text is complete, in the sense that its thoughts are self-contained and
that they deserve attention. In its self-containess, it begs for us to
expound. By commenting, perhaps we can gain deeper insight onto the
thinker 's thinking. Perhaps we can illuminate the text. This will to
knowledge calls for secondary readers to supplement the main text. A
suppleme nt replace s the main text not by proof or disproof. Instead it
vies for our attention, until the reader cannot tell which text is more
insightful - the "hard" main text, or the much easier to understand
"supplement". Soon the supplement replaces the main text as something more useful then the main text. This disservice is a disservice
because it takes the reader one step further way from the thinker.
Instead of thinkin g with the thinker, we think about another' s thoughts
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But in the talking about, we do not hear' the call for thinki ng .
When we talk about thinking, we do not thing. Instead we descend into an unthinking thoughtlessness that merely rem embers.
In the talking about, we do nothing but re-view; driving forward
looki ng through the rearview mirror.
Can we thin k with a thinker that calls on us to thi nk? Perhaps we ca n think the thinker's thoughts by outlining the thoughts.
To reco nstruct a thought one needs to know the cons truc tive argument. Arg uments themselves do not speak to being, but tries to
cap ture them into a descriptive language. To reco nstruct a construct is to have a mirror show an image. Perhaps if we must observe the thi nkers thoughts when we mirror their think ing. In observi ng, we pull important passages, con cepts, and re-construct the
thoughts. This reconstruction is a type of thinking, for it forces the
living to syn thesize, and thus create anew. A new thought? New
because it is not ide ntical with the old. But this new ness is not the
newness of a baby's birth, but the new ness found when one deforms . De-form. To de-form means to translate . If thinking is
poetry then concepts are prose . From poetry to prose, de-formation occurs . In the translation the poetics that is the poetry ceases
and becomes the poesis of prose . To prose a poe m is to pose the
poem anew'". How do we thinking with a thinker, who thinks not
on the thinker. Moreover, through the translations, improvements,

modifications and exegesis the thinker's thoughts are lost. The
greatest disservice occurs because we ourselves cease to think.
9 What calls forth thinking must be heard. More then listening, to hear
means to heed. When called upon to think, we keen our ears to the
calling and move closer to the task. To move closer, to move far and
away to a focused center ortowards its extremities is to move within a
horizonal structure. This way of moving hints of a way that is not
conceptual. To conceptualize is to take a birds-eye view of a frozen
landscape. To move horizonally means that we cannot oversee the
entire landscape. Instead we must address the landforms, monuments,
and obstacles as they occur to us in our thinking towards. At this point,
what obstacles face us, in our mediations on the Logos of calling?
10 One obstacle we're faced with is the very form of ourexpression.
The expression, I speak of is that fouod in prose. To write prose is to
write an essay. Essays gather themselves arouod a thesis. It gathers
specifically assertions that only have one meaning. Form takes
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about thoughts, nor ideas, bu t of th inking with ot her thinkers? How
do we think the thin king that thinks not by d irecting itself towards
thoughts, but in the gathering that gathers around thinking thinkers? To gather m eans to co ngress, or to pick up . W he n we thin k
with thinkers, we join into the articulation ofthinking and not merely
pi ck up the pearls of frozen wisdom.
If thinking arti cul ates livin g tho ug hts then to think about
is to co m me morate . We sho uld give tha nks . Thanking m eans listening. In thanking we pay homage. Homage acts to translate by
fo rcing us to move away from our native thoughts, and closer to
the thinker", To pay homage we read . In reading we re -gather the
priority over material issues, when writers must write within a standard
unfriendly to their thoughts. Essays control the articulation of speech a poeisis that has been alloyed with a preconceived format. To make
this format pre-eminent is to preordain literalness, concepts, assertions
and commentary. lf were aware of the transforming powers of mov ing
from one Logos to another, we would balk. But mostly, this translation
never occursto us. Wethink our words are transparent representations
of the world. Instead, they are re-presentations that create new worlds .
Take for example the translation between poetry and prose. In school,
the way a poem is mastered, is if one can write about it. To write about
a poem , one has to dissect it along conventional lines of theme , meter,
rhyme, motif, and trope. Hacked to pieces, the poems gets reconstituted into a literal format. Nuance gets lost if it has to be explained in
blunt terms. Rhyme withers and dies with words that are metered along
logical lines. In short, the prose destroys the poem, by posing it. The
American Heritage dictionary defines pose as (i) to hold a particular
position, (ii) to affect a particular mental attitude, (iii) to represent
oneself as something other then oneself, (iv) to place in a specific
position, (v) to propound or assert, (vi) and to puzzle or confu se. It is
in the first five senses ofthe word, the pose that ruins poetry. It is the
in the last sense that the frozen pose becomes deconstructively unstable. It is this last sense that gives us hope to understan d the Logos of
a call.
II Have we moved , closer towards understandi ng the language of the
call? Nowhere was this logos explicitly defmed , not in the main text ,
nor in the "supplement" ofthe footnote. Having not place, having no
concept, having no definition , have you understood the call to thinking
any better? Have you understood the call to thinking with the thinker
any better? Have you learned how to think meditatively?
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beings that the thinker has gathered in his logos. As we re-gather,
we find ourselves regarding the thinker and find ourselves confronted by the gathering of beings that the thinker has gathered. In
this gather of thought a world forms - a home world that grounds
the thinker and provokes him to answer a though t provoking call.
Only when we stan d with the thinker, do we hear him responding
to the call that calls upon his thinking. With the thinker, listening
to the call to his thinkin g, we compose our thoughts in the new
landscape. The new fades into familiarity; familiarity becomes a
new home. Finding a home away from home, we give thanks to
his thinking. We commemorate.
Have you learned to call, listen, heed and respond? If you have to
"look" for this answer, then my Logos has fallen on deaf ears.
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Afterthoughts
Reader Commentaries

Friends, Enemies and Stran2ers:
A Response to Sanchez's Analysis of Ortega y
Gasset's Man and People
Brian T. Prosser
F ordh am University
As love, if love be perfect, casts out fea r,
So hate, if hate be perfect, casts out fear.
-Lord Alfred Tennyson

I.
I read with interest Carlos Sanc hez's article "Dangerous
Encounters: The Other, the I, and Soci ality" (pri nted in this j ournal, Spring 1999).' I agree with the article 's motivation : the violence and general belligerence, that often seem to pervade our social relations and that manifest themselv es - sometimes "s hockingly" - in the events portrayed by our Nightly News, signify a
need to reflect on the deeper struct ure of sociality. I also agree with
one of the articl e's bas ic assumptions: simply ap proaching anothe r
human being with a naive expectation of friend liness, without regard for the variety of human capacities (some of them violent),
occasions a "danger of misunderstanding our relations hips to oth ers." Every moment of meeting between two persons is, at roo t,
open-ended and every pres umption about the charac ter of such
moments is risky. Unfortunately, I think Sanchez's attempt "to show
that the Other is to be taken as fundamentally dangerous" fails to
avoid such misunderstanding. In fact, I believe Sanchez's elaboration of this suggestion fosters a misunderstanding of Otherness that
is similar to the misunders tandi ng caused by naive expectation s of
friendl iness . To approach a potential friend as an enemy can be as
calamitous as approaching a potential enemy as a friend . What is
more, Sanchez's discussion misinterprets the struct ure of sociality
found in Ortega y Gasset's Man and People.
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II.
Sanchez does a fine job of describin g Ortega y Gasset's
theory of intersubjectivity.' Most important to the present discussion is that part of Ortega y Gasset's theory which describes a spectrum of intimacy that defines the "environment of humanity" in
which other persons appear to us.' As Sanchez makes clear, an
esse ntial feature of humanness is the potential reciprocity of action
that exists between me and other humans. Ortega y Gasset's "spectrum of intimacy" is simply a functio n of the actualization of this
human reciprocity. That is, when I encoun ter another human being
and act toward her, I may provoke a response that begins establi shing a history of actual reciprocation between us. For Ortega y Gasset
this is the beginning of sociality - the action that establishes "weity"· . As the history of reciprocation continues to develop between
me and the Other, she becomes more particular to me: "an individual whom I cann ot confuse with any other, for whom I can substitute no other," Thus she attains her "You-ness" in relation to
me. This You-ness - the individuality and particularity of the Other
- grows with the development of our extended history of reciprocation, and my intercourse with her thereby develops an increased
sense of intimacy. Of course, the history of reciprocity that I develop with anyone person is unique. With some I have more history, and thus a more intimate relationship. With others there is
little sense of intimacy at all. In this way we can establish a "spectrum of intimacy" for all persons with whom I come into contact.
It is important to notice, however, that a human being first
enters my consciousness in a pre-social context. That is, the very
first contact I have with any particular human being is an encounter that is prefaced by no actual history of reciprocal action between us. This poin t of initial contact is (to use Ortega y Gasset' s
words) "the extreme case of zero intimacy," At the zero-point of
intimacy the only knowledge I have of the Other's relation ship to
me is an intuition of her potential reciprocity. However, the specific form that this reciprocity will take is yet to be determined. I
cannot know it until it has been provoked by some action upon her.
Consequently, the only knowledge I have of the potential relationship between us is defined completely by generalizations that I
have formed from relationships with other people. Ortega y Gasset
puts it this way:
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Of the pure other, at the zero point of intimacy, I have no
direct intuition beyond... the sight of his-body, of his gestures, of his movements, in all of which I believe that I see
a Man, but that is all. ... To this I add something that is not
direct intuition of him, but the general experience of my
intercourse with men, a collection of generalizations concerning my instinctive intercourse with many who were
closer to me, hence something purely conceptual, or let us
say theoretical - our generic idea of Man and the human'
The problem, when this very generalized idea of humanness is the
only knowledge we have of a person, is that the tota l of human
intercourse implies a vast variety of hum an possibilities. This variety includes positive, negative and some times contradictory capacit ies. Consequently, our "theoretical" picture of Otherness is
quite vague and gains a valid interpretation only th rough an actual
(as opposed to theoretical) process of reciprocal intercourse.
An importan t point here is that past interactions with other
human beings reveal that a partic ular human being, in genera l,
may represe nt a potential enemy (for some of my past acq uaintances have become my enemies) - or, she may represent a potential
friend (for many of my past acquaintances have become friends).
Danger lies in the fact that we cannot know in advance which of
the two - friend or foe - a person at the zero- point of intimacy will
tum out to be. What is more, if I am unprepared for the poss ibility
of her being an enemy, I could end up being waylaid by this pote ntial source of harm . The problem with Sanchez's account is that he
blurs the distinction between potential enemies and actua l enemies .

III.
Grante d, in the face of potential danger it is in my best
interest to be wary. Sanchez is correct to suggest that such wariness may relieve the shock of violent behavior and , perhaps , eve n
better prepare us to find solutions to such violence . However, though
"wariness" may be prudent in the face of potential enemies, it is
likely that I would do better to be more aggressively defensive
toward someone with whom I have developed a history of reciprocity that reveals them to be an actual enemy, with a history of
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actual violence . Until such a history has been established, even
though Sanchez is right to suggest that someone should not be
immediately categorized as friendly, he is equally wrong to suggest that that person should be categorized as an enemy. Where
Sanchez presumes a dichotomy of either friend or enemy, Ortega y
Gasset offers a trichotomy of friend, enemy or stranger. At the
zero point of intimacy another person is simply a stranger with
whom I face the challenge of establishing intimacy. The fear inspired by the vast potentiality of a stranger does not warrant the
same response that may be inspired by an actual enemy.
The difference, within Ortega y Gasset's structure of sociality, between strange rs and enemies may be a subtle one. Confusion may be fostered by Ortega y Gasset's consistently describing
the stranger as "dangerous". However, the danger in strangers is of
a different character than the danger of an enemy. To assume they
are not different is a mistake. At the heart of the difference is the
fact that, by virtue of the purely theoretical knowledge we have of
the stranger, the perception of danger that we detect in her is a
theoretical danger. Not so with an enemy. The danger of an enemy
is non-theoretical: it has been demonstrated by her reciprocating
my action upon her with violence, or some action that is "against"
me.
The key here is a distinction between theoretical and nontheoretical danger s. What creates this distinction is the question of
whether any intimacy has been established between myself and
the other. As explained above, the stranger is a zero-point of intimacy. There is no history of reciprocal action that defines the nature of our relationship and that legitimately narrows our expectation of what kind of intimacy may be established between us. As
Ortega y Gasse t puts it: "The pure [and unknow n] Other is in fact
provisionally and equa lly my possible friend or my potential enemy."? Thus, as far as I am capable of knowing at the point of
initial meeting, the stranger is as much my friend as she is my
enemy. Consequently, Sanchez is wrong to suggest that Ortega y
Gasset's theory of intersubjectivity compels us to "divide my social relations between those with friends, with whom I have somehow become intimate, and enemies, those distanced from the center of my primordial sphere, and which I know nothing about except that they represent a totality of human potential,"!' If Sanchez
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'friends' with 'intimacy' and 'enemies ' with ' non-intimacy' (or, as
Sanchez puts it, " [distance] from the center of my primordial
sphere").
Apparently, Sanchez forgets that, for Ortega y Gasset, the
word 'enemy' refers to an actualized form of intimacy between
two persons. By forgetting this, when Sanchez "divides" up his
social relation s, he allows himself to mistakenly categorize strangers - those who are true non-int imates - as enemies. Thus, his reform ulation of Ortega y Gasset's structure of sociality becomes a
world that consists only of friends and "enemies" rather than Ortega
y Gasset's own trichotomous structure consisting of friends, enemies and strangers. In Ortega y Gasset's theory friends and enemies are both a type of intimate relationship. To assume that the
stranger (about whom "I know nothing ... except that they represent a totality of human potentia!") is an enemy is to presume an
intimacy that simply does not exist (yet) between me and the other.
This is precisely the same mistake that is committed by assuming
that the stranger is a friend. The stranger is in fact neither friend
nor enemy ; or we might rather say, as Ortega y Gasset suggests
above, she is equa lly friend and enemy .

IV.
I believe the real lesson to be learned from Ortega y Gasset's
theory is that we should make no presumption about whether the
unknown person , with whom I still face the challenge of developing intimacy, is a friend or enemy. Instead, I should face up to the
openness of the initial encounter and be prepared to respond to
whatever reciprocatio n the stranger offers. Though Sanchez states
that his intention was to "not engage in outlining a humane diplornacy?" the unfo rtunate effect of his misapplication of Ortega y
Gasset's theory is that he does seem to encourage a phenome nological xenophobia. In Sanchez's interpretation strangers become
enemies and are preclu ded from the expectation of friendly reciprocation.
It is true that the theoretical danger of a genuine stranger
implies real consequences for how we go about establis hing relationships: we should be wary to the extent that we accept the full
scope of the challenge of intimacy. Thi s challenge may lead to a
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violent outcome, or it may lead to a peaceful one. In any case, the
stranger and I are responsible - together - for the dynam ic process
. of reciprocation that will ultimately determ ine the nature of a more
intimate relationship that may develop between us. For my part, I
must bear this respons ibility with the expectation that, if I wish to
avoid enemies, I will have to work at creating an intimacy of trust
and friendliness. I cannot simply assume that the Other is, or will
inevitably become, a friend. Perhaps this is all that Sanchez wanted
to suggest in his article. Unfortunately, he seems instead to imply
that antagonism, like that which I would be tempted to show toward my enemies, is the best way to deal with the fear inspired by
the vast human potent iality that a stranger represents .
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Reflections
SJS U Department ofPhilosophy students, faculty, and alumn i

This is an open section for thoughts , ideas , and interests both in
and on Philosophy. The first issue featured primarily answers to
questions but this year we 've also thrown in some humor.
What is Education?
Education is the process of learning how to make decisions and
discover fact.
- Wayne Yuen, SJSU Undergraduate
Education is the medium by which the systems of knowledge acquisition and differentiation are passed down through the generations, not limited to the form al schooling of teachers, but also encompassing the relations hips of friends and family.
- Gary Buzzell, SJSU Undergraduate

Wh at is the role of philosophy in education?
Philosophy is the field that provides a rigorou s study of how we
learn and how we can make better decisions through critical thinking and logic. It also helps us weed out beliefs from facts .
- Wayne Yuen, SJSU Undergraduate

Who is your favorite philosopher and why?
My favorite philosopher is Epicurus, because he was wise enough
to see the connection between desires and our behavior, elevating
hedonism as something practical.
- Wayne Yuen, SJSU Undergraduate
My favorite philosopher is Heraclitus, for we think, or thought alike.
- Gary Buzzell, SJSU Undergraduate
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What is a philosophy of technology and why do we or do we
not need one?
Philosophy is concerned with issues of enduring importance to humankind. What is the right thing to do? What can we
know? What is beautiful? These are lasting que stions that have
been raised through the centuries and , in various forms , addressed
by all human cultures and traditions . Nonetheless , they are questions raised, understood and assessed with respec t to the conditions of a given tim e and place. Socrates and Confucius engaged
philosophical issues by addressing the conditions within which they
lived . In the last two hundred years we have come increasingly to
live in a world that is the product of our own technological powers.
The world in which we now live cannot function nor can it be
conceived apart from our technologies. In our day, what we do,
how we come to know, and the ways we express beauty tran spire
in a world in which technology is essenti al not incidental. Thi s fact
of the current human foundition calls upon us to re-ask all of the
central questions of philosophy.
Philosophy of technology addresses issue s of end uring
importance to hu mankind given the essentia lly technologica l character of the current human condition. Philosophy of technology
would seem to be a necessity, given both the traditions of our discipline and the conditions of our age.
- S. Noam Cook, SJSU Professor

Philosophical Humor
Q: How many Zenos does it take to screw in a lightbulb?
A: It can't be done ! First, you would have to screw it in half way,
then another, then another, etc.

Q: How many Platonists does it take to screw in a light bulb?
A: The one true one of course. But many can bask in the light.
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Q: How many existentialists does it take to change a light bulb?
A: Two-one to bemoan the darkness until the other redefines
something else
as light.
Q: How many Herac litians does it take to change a light bulb?20
A: None97Its already changing.20
Q: How many solipsists does it take to change a lightbulb?
A: All of them.
Q: How many Epicureans does it take to change a light bulb?20
A: None -they take advantage of the darkness!20
First Date
A boy is about to go on his first date, and is nervous about
what to talk about. He asks his father for advice. The father replies:
"My son, there are three subjects that always work. These are food,
family, and philosophy."
The boy picks up his date and they go to a soda fountain.
Ice cream sodas in front of them, they stare at each other for a long
time, as the boy's nervousness builds. He remembers his father's
advice, and chooses the first topic. He asks the girl: "Do you like
potato pancake s?" She says "No," and the silence returns.
After a few more uncomfortable minutes, the boy thinks
of his father's suggestion and turns to the second item on the list.
He asks, "Do you have a brother?" Again, the girl says "No" and
there is silence once again .
The boy then plays his last card . He thinks of his father's
advice and asks the girl the following question: "If you had a brother,
would he like potato pancakes?"
Rules
Philo sophy is a game with objectives and no rules.
Mathematics is a game with rules and no objectives.

84

GEIS T

A Philosopher's A lphabet

A is for Anaxagoras, Anaxarchus, Anaximander, Anselm, Aqu inas,
Aristotle,
and Augustine
B is for Bacon, Bentham, and Berkeley
C is for Carnap, Cicero, and Camus
D is for Democritus, Descartes, Dewey, and Diogenes
E is for Epictetus, Epicurus, Erasm us, and Euclid
F is for Ferr ier, Fichte, and Foucault
G is for Galileo, God, and Gorias
H is for Hegel, Hemp el, Heracl itus, Hobbes, Hume, and Husse rl
I is for la mbJichus , Ibn, Ingarden, and Inge
J is for James, and Jung
K is for Kant, Kierkegaard, and Kuhn
L is for Leibniz, Locke, and Lucreti us
M is for Machiavelli, Mill, and Melbranche
N is for Nagel, and Nietzsche

o is for Oken, Olivi, and Oman
P is for Paley, Parmi nides, Plato, Plo tonus, and Pythagoras
Q is for Quine
R is for Reichenbach, Rousseau , and Russe ll
S is for Sartre, and Spinoza
T is for ThaIes, and Thoreau
U is for Ueberweg, and Unamuno
V is for Vasubandhu, Vitoria, and Voltaire
W is for Wittgenstein

Reflections
X is for Xenophon and Xenophanes
Y is for Young
Z is for Zeno
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Call For Papers
We welcome papers on any philosophical topic. We will
also gladly accept comme ntaries on the essays contained in this
issue of GEIST to be included in Reflections.
To subm it a paper, please send a hardcopy and a softc opy
of your paper with a cover page. All papers should be double spaced,
l 2-point font, approximately 5 to 10 pages in length, and marked
clearly with the applicant's last four digits of their social security
number. The cover page should contain the applicant' s name, school
affiliation, undergraduate or graduate status, phone number, mailing address, email address and last four digits of social security
number. Only one paper per applicant will be reviewed.

The deadline for submissio ns: February I , 200 I.

Please send submission directly to:
GEIST
Department of Philosophy
San Jose State Universi ty
One Washington Square
San Jose, CA. 95192-0069

